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Theories contradict each other by predicting either facilitative or detrimental effects of 
sad mood on cognitive outcomes. For instance, affect-as-information models hold that sad 
mood encourages detailed and analytical processing styles, thereby improving cognitive 
abilities; and resource allocation models predict that sad mood harms cognitive abilities due to 
sad thoughts that tax limited resources such as attention and working memory. The present 
study explores these questions by exploring sad mood and one type of cognitive ability—
response inhibition (RI). The few studies examining the link between RI and sad mood are mixed 
in outcome. Understanding whether and how sad mood affects RI will help determine the 
veracity of theories that predict different cognitive performance outcomes during sad mood, 
contribute to understanding psychological problems that involve deficits in RI, and inform our 
ability to measure cognitive constructs such as RI accurately. Further, the strength of a person’s 
ability to regulate their own emotions affects the degree to which emotional states affect their 
behavior. Thus if sad mood affects RI, emotion regulation may moderate the strength of this 
effect. This study examines how sad mood and emotion regulation affected RI in a sample of 
273 undergraduate psychology students. About half of participants went through a neutral 
induction where they wrote about a typical day, and the others went through a sad mood 
induction where they wrote about a sad event they experienced. Emotion regulation was 
measured with a questionnaire, and an RI composite score of three computerized tasks (Stroop 
color-word, Stop Signal Task, and Go/No-go) was calculated using Principal Components 
Analysis. The first hypothesis predicted that sad mood would either increase or decrease RI. The 
second hypothesis predicted an interaction: that poor emotion regulation would increase this 
 
 
 
 
association in the direction of the main effect (or in either direction if there is no mood main 
effect). These a priori hypotheses were not supported, but results from post hoc analyses 
showed that though self-ratings of sad mood did not affect RI, writing about sad events (the 
experimental condition) seems to worsen RI—perhaps due to participants being distracted by 
sad thoughts. This result is consistent with cognitive load theories and literature suggesting that 
cognitive loads, rumination, and mind-wandering are detrimental to cognitive functioning. 
Further, it extends these findings from well-established areas such as working memory to the 
less-established area of response inhibition. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Existing theories attempt to explain how information-processing and affective systems 
interact and operate together. The research literature has not converged on a model, and 
existing theories suggest different answers. One theory predicts that sad mood distracts people 
and lowers cognitive abilities, and other theories predict that sad mood aids in cognitive abilities 
for various reasons. This project examines this question by exploring the interplay between 
response inhibition and sad mood. Empirical studies on response inhibition and affect are quite 
sparse, and most existing studies have small samples or are not designed to answer the present 
research questions. Further, learning about these variables can increase our understanding of 
problems that involve them such as depression. Also, knowing how sad mood affects response 
inhibition also has implications in measurement: affective states can be one of the various 
confounds that can skew a person’s score on a cognitive test to be less representative of true 
ability. The present study sheds light on these questions by manipulating and measuring sad 
mood and determining whether it affected performance on three response inhibition tasks. 
Further, whether this association was stronger for those with poor emotion regulation skills was 
explored. 
This introduction begins by discussing theories pertaining to how emotion and cognition 
interact with one another. Executive functions are then introduced, along with the executive 
function that is focused on in this project: response inhibition. Examples of the relationship 
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between response inhibition and depression are reviewed to demonstrate this variable’s clinical 
importance, followed by discussion of theories more specific to executive functions. Emotion 
regulation is then described and considered for its potential to play a role in cognition-emotion 
interactions. Finally, affect and mood inductions are reviewed with respect to “hot” 
(emotionally laden) and “cool” (devoid of emotion) response inhibition tasks. 
Cognition-Emotion Interaction 
Rather than functioning independently, cognition and emotion affect each other in a 
bidirectional relationship (Ochsner & Phelps, 2007). Huntsinger and Schnall (2013) describe 
mood as a “diffuse affective state” that does not result from an appraisal, emotion as an 
affective state that does result from an appraisal, and affect as a more broad term that 
encompasses both emotion and mood. They describe well-developed literatures showing that 
affect is essential in determining perception, memory, and perspective; in the other direction, 
they explain that cognition is key in the forming, experiencing, and regulating of emotions. So in 
cognition and emotion, one is not “above” or “primary” relative to the other, rather they are 
intertwined and critical in the proper functioning of the other. Following are brief discussions of 
some of the ways in which emotion and cognition have been theorized to interact; only a small 
proportion of this massive literature is reviewed, as the intent is only to demonstrate that these 
interactions occur and to form a foundation from which to discuss more specifically how mood 
and executive functions may interact. Also note that these various models are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive and that they are likely identifying different valid properties of cognition and 
emotion. Cognition-emotion interactions are complex and are likely mediated and moderated 
by numerous processes and variables. 
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Spreading Activation Models 
Spreading activation models offer an intuitive explanation for how affect influences 
cognition, though evidence for them is limited (Huntsinger & Schnall, 2013). These models 
assert that the thoughts that one has are partially a function of their affective state. For 
example, Bower’s associative network model (1981) asserts that moods are stored in memory 
and when activated, they spread to associated memory content. In other words, current mood 
acts as an affective prime that biases recall of thoughts and memories toward those of similar 
valence. However, Huntsinger and Schnall (2013) concluded from the literature that these 
effects are weak and only happen in certain situations. They further reason that some mood-
congruent recall effects may be explained by people’s encoding being influenced by current 
mood rather than current mood biasing recall toward mood-congruent content. Huntsinger and 
Schnall (2013) assert that emotions likely are not stored in memory, and that memories are 
instead reconstructed upon recall, and valenced based on how the memory is interpreted. 
Forgas and Koch (2013) judge this model more favorably, framing the data as representing 
boundary conditions rather than limitations: the reliability of mood congruent recall and 
thought is greatest when the moods are intense and meaningful, when the task at hand is self-
referential, and when people use open and elaborate thinking. Other models help to describe 
these interactions more fully. 
Embodiment 
The embodiment perspective (or, grounded cognition) offers an additional mechanism 
through which emotion and cognition affect each other and are affected by the physical world 
(Barsalou, 2010; Winkielman & Kavanagh, 2013). This perspective stands in contrast to the 
traditional view of amodal processing, which interprets mental processes as being generated 
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from semantic networks, and does not take sensory and motor features of stimuli into account 
in describing how the stimuli affect cognition and emotion. Rather, the embodied perspective 
considers the effects of the body, the body’s interactions with the physical world, and sensory 
modalities on emotion and cognition. For example, vision and bodily states have been found to 
affect mood and cognition. Participants listing features of a watermelon were more likely to say 
“red” and “seeds” if they were asked to think about a “half watermelon” compared to if they 
were asked to think about a “watermelon,” indicating that their visualization of the same object, 
cut in half, affected cognition by changing the features they noticed (Wu & Barsalou, 2009). This 
effect extended to naming features of a new concept—“glass car”—compared to “car.” 
Embodiment extends to affective contexts. Havas, Glenberg, and Rinck (2007) had 
participants place a pen in their teeth or lips to approximate a smile or a frown, respectively. In 
determining whether a sentence was positive or negative in valence, those “smiling” identified 
positive sentences faster and those “frowning” identified negative sentences faster. When 
embodied facial emotions matched the sentence valence, it affected the speed at which 
participants comprehended and rated the sentence; this is an example of an affective state, or 
at least an embodiment of an affective state, influencing cognition. Evidence is strong that the 
somatosensory and motor sides of emotional experiences—such as facial expressions—affect 
how emotions are processed (Winkielman & Kavanagh, 2013). Work from another perspective 
supports the possibility of affect itself representing a kind of modality, similar to how the senses 
have separate modalities. Some researchers found that, when a stimulus was presented via a 
different sensory modality than the stimulus previously presented, participants took longer to 
judge whether the stimulus was presented on their left or right side; this modality-switching 
cost effect was larger when participants switched away from the tactile modality to the hearing 
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or vision modality (Spence, Nicholls, & Driver, 2001). Perhaps there is a reaction time cost in 
switching away from the “affect modality” (e.g., feeling sad) in order to attend to a sensory 
modality, thus harming the efficiency of cognition requiring use of the senses. 
The aforementioned embodiment research is a small sampling of this impressive 
literature, which altogether convincingly drives home the notion that embodied cognition 
belongs in any comprehensive model of cognition. Within the embodiment area, there are 
numerous potential mechanisms through which emotion and cognition may affect each other. 
Affect-as-Information Models 
Affect-as-information models have garnered strong empirical support and numerous 
emotion-cognition interactions can be understood using this framework. A fundamental concept 
to these models is the Affective Immediacy Principle which holds that affective reactions are 
subjectively interpreted as pertaining to thoughts that are presently occurring in the mind 
(Clore, Wyer, Gasper, Gohm, & Isbell, 2001). The affect-as-information models hold that the 
affect an individual feels communicates information pertinent to areas such as the environment 
or internal events like thought. For instance, current mood has been observed to affect 
judgments to a greater extent than thoughts about the object of judgment. In a classic study, 
participants surveyed on sunny days compared to rainy days indicated greater life satisfaction, 
presumably due to a more positive mood being used as information in their consideration of 
their level of life satisfaction (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Other judgments are also affected by 
mood and the apparent information it provides, such as feelings of fear and anxiety increasing 
perceived risk, disgust lowering perceived value of objects, and anger raising the tendency for 
one to blame others (Huntsinger & Schnall, 2013). 
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Mood affects memory as well. While some interpret mood-congruent memory recall as 
the result of mood triggering greater activation of mood-associated content (Forgas & Koch, 
2013), others see it as the result of thoughts that have been brought to mind via mood 
manipulation (perhaps the thoughts are congruent with mood because they caused the mood 
change, instead of the other way around; Huntsinger & Schnall, 2013). Evidence for such mood 
priming mood-congruent thought is mixed (Wyer, Clore, & Isbell, 1999). For instance, Rholes, 
Riskind, and Lane (1987) found that of two mood induction techniques that decreased mood 
equally, only the one that involved directly triggering mood-consistent content using evaluative 
statements actually caused mood-congruent recall; the participants who read statements of 
somatic states often accompanying mood states had a weaker effect on the time it took to recall 
life experiences. Storbeck and Robinson (2004) compared semantic and affective priming, and 
concluded that semantic priming is more robust than affective priming. Jiang et al. (2016) 
reviewed this mixed literature and offered some results of their own: affective priming is 
prominent over semantic priming under some conditions, for instance, when stimuli are 
presented quickly and stimulus onset asynchrony is not long enough to eliminate the priming 
effects. This area is relevant to the debate about the strengths and weaknesses of spreading 
activation and affect-as-information models of emotion-cognition interaction; with the mixed 
findings, a review of this topic does not come down clearly on one side of the other. It is likely 
that both types of priming are important, as there is evidence supporting each. 
Most relevant to the present study, affect has been theorized to affect cognition by 
bringing about associated cognitive processing styles. For instance, Martin and Clore (2001) 
described positive affect as often co-occurring with a broader focus of attention and a heuristic 
processing style. By increasing reliance of general knowledge rather than focusing on details, 
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one can consume fewer cognitive resources and instead apply them to other means or tasks 
(Bless, 2001). This positive affect tendency represents a different allocation of cognitive 
resources (for instance, toward creative thinking), and not necessarily a reduced use of cognitive 
resources overall. Negative affect, on the other hand, has been theorized to serve as a signal 
that people attend to that indicates that there is a problem with the environment—such as too 
little reinforcement, negative outcomes, or threats to goal attainment (Bless, 2001). In turn, this 
encourages a finer focus on the details of the situation, which allows the individual to use that 
knowledge to improve the situation. In other words, a happy person may feel more confident 
employing the lower-resource-intensive general knowledge structures to a situation, and, 
toward the end of improving a problematic situation, a sad person may focus more closely on 
the currently available data rather than relying on general knowledge structures that increase 
the risk of overlooking meaningful details. 
Gasper and Clore’s (2002) experiments supported the idea that mood changes thinking 
style; specifically, those inducted into a sad mood focused more on the fine details of geometric 
figures and those in happy moods focused more on the general features of the figures. Follow-
up work suggests that rather than sad and happy moods directly triggering a focus on “the 
trees” and “the forest,” respectively, that instead positive mood encourages a focus on 
whichever scale is more accessible (typically, global), with negative mood encouraging a focus 
on whichever scale is less accessible (typically, local; Huntsinger, Clore, & Bar-Anan, 2010). Said 
differently, positive mood encouraged the target of focus (global vs. local) that was dominant at 
the time, such that the focus that was utilized was the one that was most recently primed. 
Others have suggested that affect influences cognitive processing by serving as feedback 
about the value of thoughts currently in mind. Clore and Huntsinger (2007) offer the explanation 
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that affect, in the form of bodily and experiential information, informs the individual about the 
value of current thought, such that positive affect confers a high value to the thoughts and thus 
encourages favorable judgements of the thoughts, and negative affect confers a low value to 
the thoughts and thus discourages favorable judgements of the thoughts. In a later paper 
(2009), they add that positive affect serves as a kind of “green light” for the cognitive processing 
strategies that are most accessible, and negative affect serves as a kind of “red light” for these 
highly accessible strategies (similar to Huntsinger & Schnall’s [2013] above description of the 
role of valence in impacting whether a local or global focus is used). The effect of positive and 
negative affect on thinking styles likely also impacts cognitive performance. For example a finer 
focus resulting from a sad mood may improve performance in some situations and worsen it in 
others. 
Effects of Emotion on Cognition 
Clearly, emotion and cognition interact in a multitude of ways. This interaction, 
considered broadly, is complex. Emotion can have an adaptive or maladaptive effect on 
cognition depending on an array of factors, including intensity of the emotion, type of cognitive 
process, context, and the degree to which a person is trying to control their emotions (Dolcos, 
Wang, & Mather, 2014). Emotion’s influence on attention and memory are two well-
documented examples of this interaction. Emotionally salient stimuli are more likely to be 
attended to and remembered. This effect can be adaptive for a task or context that requires 
attending to and remembering these emotional stimuli, yet maladaptive in contexts in which the 
emotional stimuli distract from the task goal. 
Similarly, a certain affect can be adaptive or maladaptive depending on the situation, 
task, or quality of the affect itself. Two critical components of affect are arousal (with “feeling 
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quiet” and “feeling active” at the extremes) and valence (from “feeling pleasant” to “feeling 
unpleasant,” Kuppens, Tuerlinckx, Russell, & Barrett, 2013). Available evidence points to a weak 
V-shaped model where—in aggregate—arousal tends to increase as valence becomes more 
negative or positive (Kuppens et al., 2013). Arousal and valence may influence cognition in 
adaptive and maladaptive ways depending on the situation. Lee, Itti, & Mather (2012) had 
participants identify a line that is tilted to a different slope than the other lines on the screen, 
where the target line was very different in slope for half of participants (high perceptual 
saliency), and only slightly different in slope for the other half (low perceptual saliency); all 
participants completed two types of blocks in counterbalanced order, one block with neutral 
pictures preceding most trials, the other block with negative pictures preceding most trials 
(these negative pictures were rated by others as negative in valence and high in arousal). 
Participants in the low saliency condition selected the correct line less often during the negative-
picture block compared to during the neutral-picture block, and participants in the high saliency 
condition selected the correct line more often during the negative-picture block compared to 
during the neutral-picture block. Authors concluded that arousal improved salient perceptual 
learning but impaired learning of non-salient stimuli. 
Sutherland and Mather (2012) found the same pattern of negative valence and high 
arousal stimuli increasing detection ability of salient stimuli, except the arousal trials were 
noises rather than pictures, and the task involved recalling displayed letters rather than judging 
line slopes. Participants were better able to recall letters that were displayed in high salience, 
and they were able to recall even more of these letters on negative and high-arousal trials. 
These results similarly suggest a facilitative effect of negative-valence, high-arousal stimuli in 
remembering perceptually salient stimuli. Emotion also seems to aid in the recall of prioritized 
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memories, but have the reverse effect on non-prioritized memories. Sakaki, Fryer, and Mather 
(2014) showed a series of neutral object pictures to participants. When participants were asked 
to prioritize the object presented before a “perceptual oddball” (distinguished by its frame), 
they were more likely to recall this object when the oddball was negative vs. neutral in valence; 
when they were asked to prioritize the oddball picture itself, they were less likely to recall the 
object before the oddball when the oddball was negative vs. neutral in valence. Overall, 
emotional arousal increased the ability to remember prioritized content, and decreased the 
ability to remember less important non-prioritized content. The adaptive function of these 
effects may be that people in high emotional arousal more easily forget irrelevant details so 
they can better remember relevant details. 
These results are consistent with the arousal-biased competition theory’s prediction 
that arousal increases the mobilization of cognitive resources toward high-priority stimuli, 
whether the stimuli are determined to be high-priority through bottom-up mechanisms (e.g., 
perceptual salience), top-down mechanisms (e.g., goal-relevant stimuli), or combinations of the 
two (e.g., surprise, emotional relevance, or social relevance, Mather & Sutherland, 2011). High 
arousal and negative affect do not impair performance across the board; instead, these affective 
states have differential effects depending on the demands of the task. 
Executive Functions and Emotion 
Executive Functions and Psychopathology 
The previous section described emotion and cognition as intertwined in how they 
function. Existing along with numerous other facets of cognition, executive functioning has been 
shown to impact a host of important variables. Executive functions have been defined as “a 
collection of correlated but separable control processes that regulate lower level cognitive 
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processes to shape complex performance” (Friedman et al., 2008, p. 201). There are a few 
important features of this definition. These processes are distinguishable from each other (i.e., 
separable), yet their functioning is related to the functioning of other processes (i.e., 
correlated). They are top-down control processes in that they govern simple cognitive processes 
such as selecting stimuli to attend to, inhibiting a response, or manipulating data in working 
memory (thus, this collection of processes is also referred to as cognitive control, executive 
attention, and attentional control). Zelazo and Carlson (2012) add that executive functions 
consciously direct thought, action, and emotion in order to reach goals. Further, Schmeichel 
(2007) provided strong support for the hypothesis that use of executive functions leads to an 
impaired ability to use executive functions shortly afterward. This is in line with a depletable 
resource model of executive functions and it suggests that executive functions—though often 
viewed as stable traits—likely have state components that are malleable to some variables. This 
opens the possibility of affect triggering state-like changes in people’s executive functioning. 
Response inhibition (RI), one of the executive functions, is the focus of the present study. RI is 
the ability to suppress dominant or automatic responses that may be inappropriate, unsafe, no 
longer required, or interfering with goal-directed behavior (Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 
2009; Mostofsky & Simmonds, 2008). There are large literatures devoted to exploring how RI 
functions in the context of other cognitive processes, such as working memory and attention; 
this is not a focus of this experiment, but it should be understood that RI never occurs in 
isolation. For example, successful inhibition of an inappropriate response indicates successful 
functioning of response inhibition, but this success also may depend on the individual paying 
attention to relevant stimuli that indicate that the response was inappropriate. 
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 Snyder, Miyake, and Hankin (2015) discuss the relevance of executive functions in 
mental illness, and how poor executive functioning is associated with transdiagnostic constructs 
including worry, rumination, and poor emotion regulation. The evidence for executive 
functioning impairment in mental illness is strong. Meta-analyses have found inhibition and 
other executive function deficits in schizophrenia (Mesholam-Gately, Giuliano, Goff, Faraone, & 
Seidman, 2009), major depressive disorder (Snyder, 2013), bipolar disorder (Mann‐Wrobel, 
Carreno, & Dickinson, 2011), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Snyder, Kaiser, Warren, & Heller, 
2015), and substance use disorder (Smith, Mattick, Jamadar, & Iredale, 2014), and attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (Walshaw, Alloy, & Sabb, 2010). 
 The executive function link with depression is most pertinent here, due to sad mood 
being a frequent symptom of major depressive disorder. McIntyre and colleagues (2013) 
described the role of cognitive functioning in affecting the outcomes for people with major 
depressive disorder. They report that these cognitive deficits are reliably found and ranging in 
effect size from small to medium, and that deficits in executive functioning are among the most 
replicated findings. They qualify that in considering the field’s reliance on mean-level analyses, 
these effect sizes may be underestimated in that they do not account for people with superior 
cognitive ability that experience a relative decline in their cognitive skills due to depression, but 
not to the degree where they would be considered impaired overall. In a review of cognition 
and depression research, authors stated that those with depression have inhibition deficits, 
especially when it comes to inhibiting distracting stimuli that are congruent with their depressed 
mood (Clasen, Disner, & Beevers, 2013). Snyder (2013) conducted a meta-analysis of 113 studies 
that compared those with major depressive disorder to controls using one or more executive 
functioning measures. Overall, individuals with depression performed reliably worse on 
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executive functioning measures, and results suggested that higher depression severity was 
associated with worse performance. 
Focusing on RI, a meta-analysis found that participants with depression had worse RI 
than controls whether measuring RI with tasks lacking in emotional content or with tasks that 
included emotional content (non-emotional weighted mean effect size = .32 [n = 13 studies], 
emotional effect size = .22 [n = 7]; Wright, Lipszyc, Dupuis, Thayapararajah, & Schachar, 2014). 
Participants with bipolar disorder also exhibited worse RI compared to controls (non-emotional 
effect size = .54 [n = 14], emotional effect size = .47 [n = 6]). A meta-analysis by Epp, Dobson, 
Dozois, and Frewen (2012) is in line with these findings. They found a large effect size showing 
worse RI (higher color-word Stroop interference scores) among the clinically depressed 
compared to controls (Hedges g = .86; n = 14 studies; fail-safe n = 502). Depression involves 
many more symptoms besides sad mood, but these associations offer some clues for the impact 
of sad mood on cognition. 
Executive Functions and Mood Theories 
Emotion-cognition interactions affect numerous aspects of human experience. Zooming 
in closer to the topic of this study, Mitchell and Phillips (2007) discussed theories that predict 
how mood states would affect a family of cognitive activity—executive functioning processes. 
Seibert and Ashbrook (1988) presented the resource allocation model, which posits that sad 
mood could act as a distracting cognitive load by encouraging mood-related thoughts that 
compete with thoughts about the task at hand; this theory has similarities with the spreading 
activation models discussed above. They predict worse performance on memory tasks during 
sad mood. They outlined two outcomes for the effect of sad mood on memory task 
performance. First, sad mood could consume some cognitive capacities such as attention, yet 
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not consume enough to affect task performance. This outcome is more likely if the task requires 
minimal cognitive capacity or if the mood state is mild. The other outcome is that the sad state 
consumes so much capacity that it leaves less available to commit to the task, resulting in worse 
performance. The likelihood of this outcome is increased if the mood state is strong and if the 
task requires more cognitive resources (Seibert & Ashbrook, 1988). 
Mitchell and Phillips (2007) discussed two theories that predict facilitative effects of 
negative mood on cognition, rather than detrimental effects. One is a type of affect as 
information theory. It predicts that negative mood tends to trigger a more analytic processing 
style (Schwarz & Bless, 1991). Authors theorize that the analytic state encourages attention to 
detail, systemic analysis of information, and logical consistency. Further, they propose that 
negative mood can indicate that there is a problem in the environment such as there being too 
few positive outcomes or too many negative outcomes. This may be a mechanism for mood to 
urge the person to intervene to improve the situation—analytical thinking aids in determining 
an effective response. In contrast to the heuristic-driven thought style the authors theorize to 
occur during positive moods, the analytic style from a negative mood is likely to improve one’s 
cognitive abilities. This improvement may be due to greater attention and analysis toward how 
to perform actions and tasks more effectively; Schwarz and Bless (1991) suggest that when a 
mechanism activates analytic processing to engage in a task, this processing style is then more 
likely to be used on other tasks that are carried out, including cognitive tasks. Storbeck and 
Clore (2005) found just this, with those in sad moods providing fewer false memories than those 
in happy and neutral moods, perhaps because the analytical thinking style associated with sad 
moods is less susceptible to false memories compared to the gist processing common among 
those in happy moods. 
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A third theory, Mather and Sutherland’s arousal-biased competition (2011), does not 
make specific predictions for executive functions and affect, but extrapolating the theory seems 
to support facilitative effects of sad mood on response inhibition. As discussed above, the 
theory predicts that arousal increases selective attention toward stimuli deemed high-priority 
through any of a variety of mechanisms. The priority-conferring mechanisms most relevant here 
are surprise and goal-relevance. Stimuli that allow a person to achieve current goals have an 
attention-grabbing advantage over stimuli that are not helpful in reaching goals. A person in a 
sad mood (and also probably an aroused state, based on evidence of the “V” shaped arousal-
valence association) would experience a higher priority for goal-relevant stimuli and thus be 
able to respond to them more effectively. For example, they may notice no-go trials more 
quickly and refrain their response to them more consistently, they may be more in-tune to ink 
color and more able to ignore the task-irrelevant word text in incongruent Stroop trials, and 
they may inhibit their response more efficiently to the stop signal in the stop signal task. Also, 
arousal can increase selective attention toward surprising stimuli; such stimuli in response 
inhibition tasks include infrequent no-go trials, infrequent stop signals, and incongruent color-
word Stroop trials that involve a modality contradiction. These unexpected stimuli may have 
enhanced priority among sad individuals because perceptual input clashes with prior 
knowledge, thereby increasing their competitiveness relative to other stimuli (Mather & 
Sutherland 2011). In short, high arousal (which is correlated with sad mood) increases 
processing ability for salient stimuli such as infrequent perceptual events or 
incongruent/surprising stimuli, thus improving response inhibition ability. Note that if this effect 
is found, it would only hold for response inhibition tasks that involve salient stimuli, for if they 
were non-salient stimuli, response inhibition ability would decrease. 
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Altogether these theories predict a variety of affective outcomes on cognition. The 
general trend in the literature is for affective valence and arousal to impact cognitive ability 
conditionally based on the situation and task. This makes it challenging to predict the direction 
of mood effects on a specific cognitive ability such as response inhibition. Regardless of the 
interplay between these processes, one’s capacity to alter and modulate the influence of affect 
may change the course of how these variables operate together. 
Emotion Regulation 
 Some have approached emotion-cognition interaction questions with an individual 
differences perspective by considering the impact of emotion regulation capacity. Emotion 
regulation is a core piece of subjective affective experiences; some reason that almost every 
affective experience is influenced by efforts of emotion regulation (Kuppens, Oravecz, & 
Tuerlinckx, 2010). Emotion regulation is a construct that may be relevant in predicting whether 
sad mood affects response inhibition. Considering the complex and broad nature of the emotion 
construct, emotion regulation is a similarly complex and broad construct. For instance, Suri, 
Sheppes, and Gross (2013) see emotion regulation as a process that has an impact on when a 
person feels emotion, which emotions they feel, how the emotion is experienced and 
expressed, and what happens when a person has a goal to modify emotion. Guided by Marwaha 
et al.’s (2014) exploration of emotion regulation definitions in the literature, emotion regulation 
is defined here as the ability to regulate the onset, course, and intensity of both positive and 
negative emotions and their behavioral consequences. To integrate this with previously 
discussed definitions, emotion regulation is conceptualized here as applying to mood and, more 
broadly, affect. If emotions affect executive functions and if emotion regulation is a key element 
in the trajectory of emotions, then one’s ability to regulate their emotions likely plays a role in 
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the emotion’s effect on executive functions. Supporting this, Blair et al. (2007) found evidence 
that brain processes associated with emotion regulation are used when a task involves 
emotional distracters. Emotion regulation is a complex process with a number of features to 
consider. 
Emotion regulation is multifaceted. In a seminal paper, Gross (1998) outlines five 
processes in his process model of emotion regulation, which have helped in understanding the 
sizeable and complex emotion regulation literature. (1) Situation selection is when people bring 
themselves into or avoid certain situations as a way influence their emotions. (2) Situation 
modification involves attempting to change a situation to influence emotion. (3) Attentional 
deployment is when a person focuses their attention on certain aspects of a situation in order to 
manage their emotion. (4) Cognitive change is at work when an individual changes how they 
interpret a situation. (5) Response modulation refers to managing the urges to engage in various 
behaviors that are a result of the experienced emotion. Attentional deployment and cognitive 
change are perhaps the most cognitive of the emotion regulation types (Suri et al., 2013). 
Emotion regulation is dimensional. Emotion regulation is more complex than an on-off 
switch. Emotions themselves vary by arousal, valence, and approach-avoidance; likewise, 
emotion regulation is best described dimensionally (Koole, 2010). Attempts to regulate an 
emotion vary by the amount of effort in the attempt, degree of success, and the attempted 
regulation method. 
Emotion regulation can be carried out automatically or with effort. These two forms 
are well-represented on a continuous scale with conscious, effortful, controlled processes on 
one end and unconscious, effortless, and automatic regulation on the other (Gross & Thompson, 
2007). Gyurak, Gross, and Etkin (2011) refined this notion by introducing a dual-process 
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framework intended to help integrate findings on effortful and automatic emotion into a single 
model. They define effortful emotion regulation as processes requiring conscious effort to 
begin, some amount of monitoring while they are carried out, and involving some amount of 
insight and awareness; and they define automatic emotion regulation as processes that are 
triggered by the stimulus, are carried out and completed without monitoring, and can happen 
even without the individual’s insight or awareness. 
Emotion regulation and emotional reactivity are different. Though the experience of 
an emotion and the regulation of that emotion are not entirely discrete processes, emotional 
reactivity and emotion regulation are distinguishable. Gross and Thompson (2007) acknowledge 
that whether emotion and emotion regulation are separable is a difficult question, but they also 
acknowledge the value of a two-factor view for analyzing basic processes, individual differences, 
and for designing clinical interventions. Koole (2010) explains that primary and secondary 
emotional responses can differ qualitatively. For the regulation of an emotion to have a target 
to act upon, the emotion the person wants to change in some way must first be present. This 
unregulated emotion is the primary response to a situation and the efforts to change it in some 
way constitute the emotion regulation effort, leading to the regulated emotion. A 
unidimensional conceptualization of emotional difficulties is often incomplete; emotion 
regulation deficits make it harder to manage the emotion that is already there, but more 
extreme emotional reactivity leads to the generation of more extreme emotions to begin with. 
Stronger emotions take more emotion regulation to influence, and weaker emotion regulation 
skills can make even moderate emotional reactions difficult to manage. The emotion regulation 
construct used here is admittedly intertwined with emotional reactivity, but sorting out these 
two constructs is outside the scope of this project. Regulation of an emotion changes the course 
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of that emotion’s impact on behavior and other outcomes; considering individual differences in 
the ability to regulate emotions has potential to explain some of the emotion-cognition 
interaction phenomenon. 
Executive Functions and Sad Mood 
Hot and cool cognition. Before diving into executive function studies and affect, it is 
important to differentiate between hot and cool tasks. Zelazo and Carlson (2012) have described 
executive functioning tasks as either “hot” or “cool.” Cool tasks make use of abstract problems 
that lack context and have minimal if any affective or motivational components. Hot tasks also 
involve top-down processes, but these processes occur in contexts that encourage greater 
motivation or emotion due to higher stakes. These situations include tasks or environments with 
affective stimuli (i.e., emotionally significant), also situations that can result in reward or 
punishment (i.e., motivationally significant). Similar to how executive functions are entwined in 
some ways and separable in others, hot and cool executive functioning share some overlap by 
operating together, but are also governed by some distinct mechanisms (for instance, 
orbitofrontal area for hot and lateral-prefrontal area for cool executive functioning). This is 
shown in lesion studies, in which depending on lesion location, people can be impaired in hot, 
cool, or both forms of executive functioning (Zelazo & Carlson, 2012). 
 Gutiérrez-Cobo, Cabello, and Fernández-Berrocal (2016) considered hot and cool 
cognition in regard to emotional intelligence—an individual differences construct that includes 
emotion regulation as part of its definition, but also emotion-perception, -appraisal, -expression, 
-understanding, and -use in aiding thought (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Gutiérrez-Cobo and 
colleagues (2016) reviewed studies involving cognitive tasks and emotional intelligence, finding 
that participants exhibiting greater emotional intelligence on performance-based metrics 
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tended to perform better on various hot cognitive tasks; however, there was great variability in 
the measures used to assess emotional intelligence and cognition. To address this limitation, in a 
follow-up study they administered hot and cool go/no-go tasks and emotional intelligence 
measures to 187 psychology undergraduates (2017). The results most relevant here were that 
those with poor emotional intelligence made more false alarm errors on the hot go/no-go task 
(i.e., worse response inhibition), but did not make more of these errors on the cool go/no-go. 
This shows a beneficial relationship between emotional intelligence (a measure related to 
emotion regulation) and superior performance on hot response inhibition tasks. 
Response Inhibition and Sad Mood 
 Hot RI tasks. Though part of the variance measured by hot RI tasks is the participants’ 
responses to affective content, it is relevant to review some of these studies because other 
portions of the variance corresponds to RI performance. To examine the relationship between 
emotional lability and RI, researchers administered several types of go/no-go tasks to 45 
undergraduates (Lee, Turkel, Woods, Coffey, & Goetz, 2012). Two of the go/no-go tasks were 
emotionally neutral (using body-related words and household item words as stimuli, or using 
male faces and female faces as stimuli), and two of the go/no-go tasks were emotionally 
valenced (angry vs. happy faces and positive vs. negative words). Using hierarchical regression, 
two subscales from the Affective Lability Scale – Short Form, Depression-Anxiety and Anger, 
were not predicted by any RI metrics. However, a scale measuring the tendency to switch 
between the depression and elation moods was predicted by the commission-error-based RI 
metric from both the emotional faces and emotional words tasks, as well as the reaction-time-
based RI metric from the emotional faces task. No RI metrics from non-emotional go/no-go 
tasks predicted affective lability scales. So, the emotional RI tasks were better predictors of 
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affective lability than non-emotional RI tasks. Authors interpret these results to mean that a 
greater degree of changes between feelings of depression and elation seems to be associated 
with a lower ability to use inhibitory control in emotional contexts. These results should be 
interpreted with caution due to the small sample size and sampling procedures: 16 people 
scored high on a questionnaire measure of borderline personality disorder and 29 people scored 
low. While this yielded a normal distribution of borderline traits which met the normality 
assumption of the regression analyses they conducted, it limits the extent to which these 
findings can be generalized to the population of people who have a moderate degree of 
borderline traits. In another study, researchers administered emotional (happy and sad faces) 
and non-emotional (green and red circles) go/no-go tasks to the same participants, and more 
commission errors were made on the no-go trials of the emotional version (Schulz et al., 2007). 
Others also found that emotional stimuli impaired go/no-go performance (De Houwer & 
Tibboel, 2010). 
 Verbruggen and De Houwer (2007) found that emotional content in the Stop Signal Task 
also worsened RI, though their study lacked an individual differences perspective. Twenty-three 
undergraduates completed a modified Stop Signal Task where positive, neutral, or negative 
images appeared briefly before each trial. Stop signal reaction time scores were longer for both 
negative- and positive-image trials, indicating worse RI; scores did not differ between positive- 
and negative-image trials. The emotional content embedded in the task reduced RI abilities. This 
was also the case for researchers who used emotional content as the actual target stimuli in the 
Stop Signal Task, rather than simply displaying them before the trials (Rebetez, Rochat, Billieux, 
Gay, & Van der Linden, 2015). Participants had a longer stopping process on trials requiring 
them to determine the gender of emotional faces, compared to neutral face trials. On another 
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task, emotional trials caused participants to demonstrate poorer inhibition in the form of more 
proactive interference. Herbert and Sütterlin (2011) reached a similar finding—their participants 
had longer stop-signal reaction times on trials involving positive or negative words compared to 
neutral words. Similarly, participants in another study had longer stop-signal reaction times on 
trials following negative pictures (Kalanthroff, Cohen, & Henik, 2013). Pessoa, Padmala, Kenzer, 
and Bauer (2012) found facilitative effects of fearful and happy faces in a Stop Signal Task, and 
detrimental effects of threatening stimuli that had been paired with electric shocks. 
Consistently, the arousal and/or valence of emotional stimuli has an effect on response 
inhibition. 
 Imbir and Jarymowicz (2012) administered the emotional Stroop task to 100 students, 
and found evidence for the emotional Stroop effect: reaction times for color-naming of neutral 
words was significantly shorter than reaction times for color-naming of negative words. Gilboa-
Schechtman, Revelle, and Gotlib (2000) found greater interference (i.e., worse response 
inhibition) with negative compared to positive Stroop words. In a sample of 87 undergraduates, 
Martin and Thomas (2011) found a greater emotion Stroop effect among those who scored low 
on a measure of emotional intelligence, suggesting that people with greater emotional 
intelligence are better able to disregard the irrelevant emotional stimuli. Coffey, Berenbaum, 
and Kerns (2003) obtained a somewhat different result: those self-reporting that they attend 
more to their emotions exhibited a greater emotional Stroop effect, maybe because they 
attended more to the emotion words in the task. Overall, evidence is mixed that negative 
moods impair RI when it is measured using hot tasks. 
 Cool RI tasks with mood induction. Studies employing hot measures of response 
inhibition are mixed in whether negative emotion causes detrimental effects on RI ability. Cool 
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tasks offer a different perspective. For instance, Patterson and colleagues addressed a question 
that cannot be answered with hot RI tasks. They wondered whether emotional experiences may 
affect RI in a lasting manner, such that they affect RI performance even after the emotional 
stimuli are not present (Patterson et al., 2016). If RI deficits persist after emotional stimuli have 
been withdrawn, this would suggest that negative affect can have a lingering detrimental effect 
on top-down control. They found this effect in a sample of 52 community participants who 
completed the stop signal task: RI performance (stop-signal reaction time) was significantly 
worse when participants had viewed a block of negative images before the task. Their work 
demonstrates that for affect to impact RI performance, the affect-triggering stimuli need not be 
present within the task itself (as in hot tasks), but instead may be presented before the 
emotion-lacking task begins (cool tasks). Hot tasks may harm cognitive performance via divided 
attention, but the effects of emotional stimuli may linger long enough to affect a cool cognitive 
task. 
Other researchers have investigated the effects of a mood induction on RI. Researchers 
examined RI and emotion responding by administering the stop-signal task to 67 participants, 
then manipulating their moods to be either neutral, angry, or anxious using autobiographical 
recall (Tang & Schmeichel, 2014). They found that individuals with worse response inhibition 
exhibited higher increases in anger after the anger induction. The authors proposed that those 
with stronger inhibition scores were more successful in regulating emotional states, even after 
controlling for reactivity-related personality traits. This supports the prediction that RI and 
emotion regulation are related. 
Brand, Verspui, and Oving (1997) found decreased Stroop errors and increased reaction 
time in a group of 60 participants that received a depressed film clip induction, but no 
 
 
24 
 
interference differences; the decreased errors may be a reflection of the hypotheses that those 
in a sad mood have a greater focus on details or on more salient content. Hale and Strickland 
(1976) failed to find interference differences between a group of 20 people who received a 
neutral induction and 20 who received a sad induction, and others failed to find sad-mood 
performance differences in go/no-go or Stroop among 33 participants (Chepenik, Cornew, & 
Farah, 2007). Smallwood, Fitzgerald, Miles, and Phillips (2009) found that, compared to 
participants induced into a positive mood, those induced into a negative mood made more 
errors on a go/no-go task, reported more off-task thoughts, and were less efficient in re-
directing attention to the task after an error. These differences did not emerge when comparing 
those in a negative mood to those in a neutral mood. Imbir and Jarymowicz (2012) administered 
to 81 university students the antisaccade task. The participants made fewer errors after reading 
neutral statements compared to reading negative statements. 
Few studies have investigated RI and mood state, and most of them suffer from small 
sample sizes. In searching the research literature, no studies were found that used a composite 
RI score to investigate affect; rather, they used scores from individual RI tasks. This is important 
because combining RI scores into a latent variable lessens the task-impurity problem of 
cognitive measurement and creates a tighter measure of the construct by reducing the amount 
of random error measurement (Friedman & Miyake, 2017). Thus, little confidence can be placed 
in these mixed results due to the minimal amount of research that has been done on this 
research question. Only one study came close to addressing the present research question 
involving current mood, emotion regulation, and RI (Lee, Turkel, Woods, Coffey, & Goetz, 2012), 
but they examined the effect of emotional content within the RI tasks (hot tasks), rather than 
the effect of current mood on cool RI tasks. Further, it is unclear whether RI tasks with 
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emotional content are measuring RI to the same extent that cool RI tasks are. In sum, Mitchell 
and Phillips’ (2007) complaint that there is a lack of research on mood and inhibitory functioning 
remains true. 
These limitations of the existing literature highlight that the relationship between sad 
mood and response inhibition has not been satisfactorily explored. Understanding this 
relationship is important for two main reasons. First, it is another test of the various theories 
predicting mood effects on cognition; does sad mood reduce cognitive efficiency by encouraging 
a distracting cognitive load, or does it increase cognitive efficiency by encouraging a more 
analytic thinking style or biasing attention toward goal-relevant stimuli? Understanding the 
relative value of these theories, and how sad mood and cognition affect each other, can also 
help us have a deeper understanding for mental illness and how to treat it. Knowing the 
conditions under which affect and cognition interact to reduce functioning or increase 
unpleasant or disruptive symptoms may help us to develop more effective treatments. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis One 
 The first hypothesis is not novel, but it reflects an important association that has not yet 
been satisfactorily investigated: sad mood is associated with changes in response inhibition. 
Broadly, this hypothesis concerns whether an affective state impacts a cognitive process. 
Contrary to independence accounts of affect and cognition, evidence strongly supports an 
interactive model. Associations between affect and cognition are prevalent in the literature; for 
instance, emotional stimuli are more likely to be attended to and remembered. More 
specifically, this hypothesis concerns whether a more transient mood state can affect an 
executive function. Supporting this premise, negative stimuli have been found to improve 
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cognitive performance in some situations and worsen it in others (Forgas & Koch, 2013). Also, 
those suffering from mood disorders involving frequent sad mood, such as major depressive 
disorder, tend to perform worse on executive functioning tasks (e.g., Epp et al., 2012). If 
emotion and mood affect cognition, and more specifically if mood affects the efficiency of 
executive functions, then it is likely that sad mood has some influence on another executive 
function—response inhibition. Though the literature on sad mood and response inhibition is 
scarce and mixed, there is evidence for the premises on which this hypothesis depends. In the 
present study, this hypothesis will be supported if a linear multiple regression reveals that sad 
mood ratings significantly predict the RI score in either direction. If this effect is found, its 
direction will lend support to some emotion-cognition interaction theories but not others; sad 
mood impairing response inhibition could be explained by the resource-allocation model, where 
sad mood and the thoughts that come with it consume cognitive resources, leaving fewer 
resources to efficiently perform the response inhibition tasks. Sad mood facilitating response 
inhibition could be explained by the affect-as-information model, where the manipulated sad 
mood encourages attention to details (“the trees”) with the goal of improving the situation, 
which in turn improves response inhibition performance. 
Hypothesis Two 
 The second hypothesis is that sad mood will have a greater effect on RI scores among 
those who have more difficulties in emotion regulation. For emotion regulation to impact the 
sad mood-RI relationship, there must be some capacity for sad mood to affect RI. Further, if this 
hypothesis is true, emotion regulation ability should show a pattern of moderating other affect-
cognition associations, for example by strengthening the effect of affective states on cognitive 
variables among those unskilled at regulating their emotions (consider Lee, Turkel, Woods, 
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Coffey, & Goetz, 2012). In the present study, this hypothesis will be supported if a linear 
multiple regression reveals that sad mood ratings and high emotion dysregulation interact to 
predict RI in the direction of the mood main effect, or in either direction if there is no mood 
main effect. If there is no mood main effect yet mood and emotion regulation interact to predict 
RI, it could mean that mood does affect RI, but only in the context of poor emotion regulation.
28 
 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
 
 
Participants 
A total of 304 undergraduate psychology students from the University of North Carolina 
at Greensboro participated in the Fall 2015 and Spring 2016 semesters. All data from 25 people 
were discarded due to research assistant error, from three people because they did not follow 
instructions, and from two people due to technical errors. A crude check was used to gauge the 
sincerity of mood self-reports; to encourage honest responses, participants first read that they 
have completed the experiment and that they will receive course credit no matter how they 
answer the following question: “You were asked to rate your mood four times. Did you try to 
rate your mood honestly?” Options were “Yes” and “No,” but participants were asked to “please 
explain what you mean” if they answered “No.” Data were deleted for participants who (1) 
replied “No,” (2) did not indicate any degree of honest responding in the text box, and (3) 
indicated that their reports were inaccurate, for example due to lack of effort or dishonesty. 
These criteria for data retention were purposefully forgiving so that only the blatant cases of 
dishonest responding were removed. One person’s data were deleted under these criteria 
because they indicated that they did not rate their mood honestly and stated that they took 
their mood rating “down a little” to not “seem expressionless.” Demographics from 30 of the 31 
individuals were similar to retained participants in ethnicity (43% African American, 40% 
Caucasian), sex (67% female), and age (Mage = 20.90, SDage = 8.28, with equal variances not 
29 
 
assumed t (29) = -1.26, p = .22; the discarded data from one of these 31 people were mistakenly 
deleted). 
Ultimately data from 273 people were retained for exploratory analyses. They were 
aged 17 to 32 (Mage = 18.99, SDage = 1.70; 64% female; 42% African American, 33% Caucasian; 
see Table 1; with an α-level of .05 and power of .8016, G*Power indicated that 199 participants 
were required to detect a change in r2 of .04 [Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009]). There 
were 225 participants with valid data from all tasks and the questionnaires—these people were 
used for the a priori analyses (Mage = 18.96, SDage = 1.63; 65% female; similar ethnicity 
distribution). 
Materials 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS) 
The DERS is a widely used trait measure of emotion regulation that is comprised of six 
facets (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). The Nonacceptance facet measures negative secondary 
emotions that occur in response to negative primary emotions, the Goals facet measures 
difficulty carrying out goal-directed behavior during negative emotion, and the Impulse facet 
reflects difficulty controlling behavior in the face of negative emotion. Awareness taps into 
inattention and un-awareness of emotions, Strategies measures a lack of confidence in one’s 
ability to deal with emotions once they are upset, and Clarity measures how much people know 
the emotions they are experiencing. The DERS overall score demonstrated convergent validity 
by correlating in the expected directions with high-quality questionnaires measuring 
participants’ expectations for whether they will be able to regulate negative moods, emotional 
expressivity, self-harm among women and men, and intimate partner abuse among men. Test-
retest reliability was good (ρ = .88, p < .01). In the present sample, Cronbach’s α of the six 
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factors ranged from .8 to .9, indicating good internal consistency; the overall DERS scale had 
Cronbach’s α = .93 indicating excellent internal consistency. Correlations between the six factors 
were similar in Gratz and Roemer’s study and in the present study (Table 2). 
 Data from this scale were deleted for one person because they failed to respond to 
more than 10% of items. The DERS data were examined visually for response sets—like 
someone answering in a repeating pattern—and checked for uniform responses with a standard 
deviation (SD) of zero; no participants exhibited these patterns. There were 272 remaining DERS 
responses that were used for main or exploratory analyses—none of these responses had 
missing data and all scores were within 3 SD of the mean, so missing and extreme value 
replacement were not necessary. After using the subscales to calculate the overall DERS score, 
the same procedure was used on the subscales. Across the subscales, seven values from six 
participants were more than 3 SD greater than the mean, so they were replaced with the value 3 
SD above the mean. 
Response Inhibition 
The primary RI measure was the linear combination of three RI tasks. The goal was for 
this to be a more “clean” measure of RI in two ways. First, it is comprised of RI scores from cool 
tasks in order to minimize variance from emotional sources, such as differing levels of 
motivation or one’s reaction to emotional content built into the task itself. Along with capturing 
RI variance, hot tasks capture emotional processing variance; the goal here is to measure cool RI 
as closely as possible. Second, using a linear combination of all three tasks cuts out some non-RI 
variance, thereby increasing the proportion of RI variance contained in the RI variable. Many 
tasks measure RI, yet every task generates error variance that is not associated with RI. Miyake 
and Friedman (2012) termed this the task-impurity problem; each task is necessarily embedded 
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in a task context which can account for a significant proportion of the variance. One way to 
obtain a measure of RI with less unrelated variance is to generate a latent variable using three 
or more tasks that measure RI (Friedman et al., 2008). This variable is comprised of only the 
variance that multiple RI tasks share. Ideally this variance is mostly associated with RI because 
the variance unique to each task has been removed. This latent variable provides an RI metric 
that is less contaminated with error variance. The present study design precludes the use of a 
latent variable because a Confirmatory Factor Analysis with only three indicators and one factor 
results in a saturated model (that is, zero degrees of freedom), but a linear combination using 
Principal Components Analysis also yields a multiple-indicator measure of RI. This is superior to 
using a simple average score because each indicator can be weighted differently based on its 
psychometric contributions to the scale (Rencher & Christensen, 2012). 
Go/No-Go Task 
Criaud and Boulinguez (2013) found in a meta-analysis that the go/no-go paradigm and 
the stop-signal task have become the two most popular measures of RI based on quantity of 
published studies. They reviewed 109 fMRI go/no-go tasks and focused on three dimensions 
that contributed to the level of complexity of the task. First was the level of difficulty in 
identifying the no-go stimuli, second was the frequency of the no-go stimuli, and third was the 
working memory requirements of the task. They note that most of the published go/no-go tasks 
are complex and burdensome in at least one of these dimensions, and that they often require 
significant functioning of cognitive processes besides RI, for example, selective attention and 
sustained attention. To maximize RI measurement, the present study used a simple go/no-go 
design with minimal working memory and stimuli identification requirements. 
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The three RI computer tasks were run using Inquisit (2014). Participants responded to 
go stimuli by pressing the space key and tried to refrain from responding to no-go stimuli. An 
empty horizontal rectangle was displayed as a fixation point for 300 ms, followed by a go or no-
go stimulus that was on the screen until the participant responded or until 1,000 ms had passed. 
Each trial ended with a 700 ms interval. The go stimulus was the empty fixation rectangle filled 
with green (90% of trials) and the no-go stimulus was the empty rectangle filled with blue (10% 
of trials). The 250 trials were presented randomly. The RI score reflects failings of RI: the 
proportion of no-go targets to which the participant responded (i.e., commission errors or false 
alarms). The plan was to keep all data from the Go/No-go regardless of poor performance, but it 
was warranted to discard data from one participant who clearly misunderstood the task: they 
responded to all no-go trials and inhibited responses to all go trials. Four Go/No-go scores that 
were greater than 3 SD from the mean were replaced with the actual value at 3 SD from the 
mean. 
Stroop Color-Word Task 
This task required participants to speak into a microphone the color of the ink in which 
stimuli were presented. Specifications for this administration are partially based on Friedman 
and Miyake (2008). Participants began with an 18 trial practice block of control and incongruent 
trials. Then, 120 trials were presented randomly and without replacement. In 60 control trials, 
the stimulus was a series of asterisks colored red, black, blue, green, or yellow that was 
comprised of the same number of asterisks as letters in the color-word (e.g. a black series of 
asterisks contained five asterisks). Each of the five control stimuli were presented 12 times. In 
60 incongruent trials, the stimulus was one of the five previously mentioned color-words that 
did not match the color of the ink. Each of the 20 incongruent stimuli (such as the word “blue” in 
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red or yellow ink) were presented three times. RI was measured using the interference score: 
the mean reaction time of correct incongruent trials minus the mean reaction time of correct 
control trials (congruent trials were not used to calculate interference scores because this score 
would capture the combined facilitative effect of congruent trials and detrimental effect of 
incongruent trials, the goal is to isolate the effect of incongruent trials). Each stimulus appeared 
and stayed on the screen until the participant responded; when participants responded 
incorrectly, the stimulus disappeared and a red X appeared briefly to indicate their mistake, and 
when they responded correctly the stimulus simply disappeared. Then the screen was blank for 
500 ms before the next trial began.  
Stroop data were deemed invalid for those who scored below chance accuracy (20%) for 
control trials (no data were discarded for this reason) or for those with a mean reaction time on 
correctly-responded-to control trials > 3 SDs from the overall mean. Long reaction times to 
complete the simple task of naming a color likely represent poor effort (Stroop data from six 
people were discarded for this reason). Stroop data from one person were deleted because the 
task froze and from one other person because they replied “yes” to the survey question that 
asked if they were colorblind. The Stroop was not administered to one participant because they 
were deaf and, upon learning that the task required speaking, said they would prefer to not 
complete the task. To limit the effect of extreme values, interference scores that were greater 
than 3 SD from the mean were replaced with the actual value at 3 SD from the mean (two 
extremely low and three extremely high interference scores replaced). 
Stop-Signal Task 
Participants engaged in a choice reaction time task, for example, pressing a left key in 
response to a left-facing arrow or a right key in response to a right-facing arrow (Verbruggen & 
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Logan, 2009). This task had a practice block of 32 trials followed by 3 blocks of 64 trials each; the 
first trial of each block and the entire practice block were not used. Participants focused on a 
fixation point until a left or right arrow appeared, pressing the left arrow key if a left arrow 
appears and the right arrow key if a right arrow appears. Twenty-five percent of trials were stop-
signal trials in which a tone played shortly after the arrow appeared. This tone is the stop-signal, 
and upon hearing it, participants tried to inhibit their response to the stimulus by not pressing 
any key. The delay between the arrow appearing and the tone playing is called the stop-signal 
delay, and this value varied based on the participant’s performance. When the participant 
responded when they were supposed to inhibit (a commission error), the next stop-signal trial 
was made easier by shortening the stop-signal delay by 50 milliseconds. Successful inhibitions 
resulted in the next stop-signal trial becoming more difficult by lengthening the stop-signal delay 
by 50 milliseconds. This adjustment procedure was used in determining each participant’s stop-
signal reaction time (SSRT). The SSRT is an estimate of RI and is a measure of how much time is 
required for an individual to inhibit an in-progress response before it is completed. An estimate 
of SSRT was calculated for each participant as described in Verbruggen, Logan, and Stevens 
(2008): (mean reaction time of all correctly-responded-to no-signal-trials) minus (mean stop-
signal delay). To obtain an accurate estimate of SSRT, the stop-signal delay at which participants 
are able to inhibit about 50% of their responses must be known; in other words, this is the point 
at which the “race” between the go-process and the stop-process is tied, and this can be used to 
estimate the SSRT (Williams, Ponesse, Schachar, Logan, & Tannock, 1999). Accordingly, Stop-
Signal Task data were deemed invalid if the probability of the participant responding to stop-
signal trials was significantly different from .5 (α < .05). Thirty-nine people’s Stop-Signal data 
were deleted for this reason, most likely because they did not understand the task or were 
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exhibiting poor effort. Stop-Signal data from one person were deleted because the research 
assistant did not turn on the speakers, and the task was not administered to one person 
because they were deaf. No SSRTs were greater than 3 SD from the mean. 
 People vary on stop-signal reaction time scores, allowing this task to measure trait-like 
constructs such as RI (though perhaps with state-like components as well). Individuals that have 
lower stop-signal reaction time scores may have more efficient RI abilities (i.e., compared to 
others, their stop process takes less time to complete from start to finish relative to their go 
process). Individuals with lower stop-signal reaction times were more able to inhibit their 
responses on trials in which stop-signals sounded after longer stop-signal delays. 
Mood Induction 
Manipulating mood in participants allows us to examine mood “in action” rather than 
using retrospective self-reports that rely on participants’ insight and memory. The mood 
manipulation technique used in the present study—autobiographical recall—has been shown to 
effectively increase sad mood in literature reviews and meta-analyses (Martin, 1990; 
Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996). By using an autobiographical mood induction, 
participants generated their own personalized stimuli which hopefully were more powerful than 
standard stimuli such as music or pictures. In an attempt to recruit participants’ effort to further 
increase the power of the manipulation, they were instructed to use autobiographical recall to 
make themselves sad. A concern when participants have insight into the induction is that some 
may report a mood change when none has occurred (i.e., demand characteristics; Martin, 1990). 
However, in studies where participants are provided with this insight, they often display signs of 
mood change that they would not “fake,” including changes in eye movements and physiological 
measures. Additionally, mood change is also often apparent when participants do not realize 
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that they are being observed (Martin, 1990). The purpose of the mood induction was to increase 
the variability of mood to allow for testing the effects of a wider range of sad mood. 
Participants were randomly placed into one of the two conditions using the Qualtrics 
Survey Flow Randomizer feature. Research assistants were blind to condition. In the 10-minute 
initial induction, sad-condition participants were provided text instructions: “Please get yourself 
into a sad mood by reflecting on a sad event from your life for the next 10 minutes” (similar to 
Gunn & Finn, 2015). They were asked “What was the event?” and to “Please type in as many 
details as you can remember about the event. Really try to place yourself in the event.” The 
initial induction for neutral-condition participants was similar: “Please get yourself into a neutral 
mood by reflecting on what a typical day is like for you for the next 10 minutes.” They were 
asked “What is a typical day like for you?” and “Please type in as many details as you can 
remember about your typical day. Really try to place yourself into your typical day.” Participants 
were unable to move to the next screen until ten minutes had elapsed. 
 Two redux mood inductions were identical and lasted five minutes. “Please get yourself 
into a sad/neutral mood by reflecting for 5 minutes on the event/typical day you wrote about 
earlier. Here is what you wrote:”. The details typed by the participant in the initial induction 
were displayed below this text for five minutes. The redux mood inductions did not involve 
more typing. 
Mood Self-Report 
A continuous mood measure was used in a priori analyses in an attempt to accurately 
reflect the dimensionality of mood and to conduct a more powerful analysis; this was intended 
as a measure of valence rather than arousal. The four mood self-reports were visual analogue 
scales that were presented before the mood induction and before each of the three 
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computerized RI tasks. To check that the induction lasted through the three tasks, multiple 
check-ins were necessary. A short single-item measure was used in order to allow for these 
multiple check-ins and to minimize participant fatigue. While it is possible that some validity was 
sacrificed in using a short measure, the baseline mood measure showed some validity by 
correlating with the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale. Participants were instructed to 
“Rate your mood: lower numbers are sad mood and higher numbers are happy mood.” Framing 
mood in this way is acceptable to scientists subscribing to the bipolar conceptualization of affect 
(e.g., Russell, 2017), but not to those subscribing to the bivariate conceptualization of affect 
(e.g., Larsen, 2017). Participants responded by dragging a slider along a 0 to 100 point scale to 
indicate their current mood. The sad mood variable was the mean of the three mood ratings 
that occurred immediately before each task (mood ratings two, three, and four). Lower scores 
indicate a more sad mood and higher scores indicate a less sad mood. Mood scores that were 
less than 3 SD from the mean were replaced with the actual value at 3 SD from the mean (two 
extremely low mood scores replaced for the baseline mood ratings, but all other mood ratings 
were within 3 SDs of the mean). These scores are naturally bounded by the scale itself, but 
extreme values were controlled in this way in order to remain consistent with how other 
variables were controlled. 
Procedure 
 One to three people participated at once. Each participant sat alone in a room about 
21.5 inches from a computer monitor. A blank white wall was behind each monitor. Sessions 
lasted about 50 – 60 minutes. 
Participants signed in and were read a script that included letting them know that their 
data would be confidential and not linked to their name, and that they will “write about some of 
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your experiences for 10 minutes” and complete three computer tasks. Participants then 
provided consent, completed a computerized DERS, and completed the first of four mood self-
reports. Next was the initial 10-minute phase of the mood induction, followed by administration 
of the second mood self-report. Participants then completed the first of three counterbalanced 
response inhibition tasks (Haahr & Haahr, 1998). After the first RI task was the first mood 
induction redux, followed by the third mood self-report. Next was the second RI task then the 
second mood induction redux, then the fourth mood self-report. Participants then completed 
the final RI task, then answered the questions about the sincerity of their attempts to rate their 
own mood. The study concluded and the participants were debriefed. (see Figure 1 for 
Procedural Flow Chart).
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
 
Data Preparation 
Data Reduction 
The 225 cases with all valid data were used to determine whether reducing the three RI 
metrics into a single variable would be appropriate. The three RI metrics were standardized and 
a Principal Components Analysis was conducted on them (see Table 3 for descriptives and Table 
4 for Principal Components Analysis). One component was extracted with an eigenvalue of 
1.401; the next highest eigenvalue was .866. The first factor explained 46.700% of the variance. 
Two extremely high values of this component were replaced with the value 3 SD above the 
mean. All three metrics correlated with the factor at the p < .001 level, with Go/No-go r = .735, 
Stop Signal Task r = .711, and Stroop Color Word r = .597; that is, the extracted linear 
combination explains between 35.6% and 54.0% of the variance in each of the RI metrics, and 
though Stroop Color Word contributed significantly to the factor, it contributed less than the 
other two metrics. The PCA yielded a single interpretable component that correlated with each 
of the three RI metrics, so it was named the “RI Component” and used in the a priori regression. 
Higher scores on the RI component indicate worse response inhibition. 
Analyses 
 The mood induction was effective. As expected, the first mood rating after the 
manipulation was different between groups (sad mood mean [SD] = 50.97 [23.05] and neutral 
40 
 
group mean = 67.78 [19.74] with Levene’s test indicating unequal variances, t (262) = -6.46 with 
equal variances not assumed, p < .01). Baseline mood ratings were not different between 
groups (sad mood mean (SD) = 71.07 (20.22) and neutral group = 69.64 (19.89) with Levene’s 
test indicating equal variances, t (270) = .59, p = .56). See tables 5 and 6 for correlation matrices. 
Notably, the RI Component correlated negatively with the mood condition variable, indicating 
worse performance among those in the sad condition (r = -.15, p < .05). The RI Component 
correlated positively with the DERS score, indicating that people with greater emotion 
regulation difficulties performed slightly worse on RI tasks (r = .16, p < .05). Baseline self-
reported mood did not correlate with any RI measures, but those with greater emotion 
regulation difficulties reported sadder moods (r = -.46, p < .01). All mood self-reports correlated 
negatively with five of the six DERS subscales (p < .01; the Aware subscale correlated only with 
baseline mood). The Impulse subscale correlated positively with the RI Component (r = .19, p < 
.05), indicating worse RI performance among those who have difficulty regulating their behavior 
while they are feeling negative emotions. 
A Priori Analysis 
The hypotheses were tested with linear multiple regression (n = 225). The mean mood 
rating was centered and entered into Step 1 as the predictor; the centered sum score of the 
DERS was entered into Step 1 as the moderator. The interaction term of the mean mood rating 
and DERS was entered into Step 2, and the outcome variable was the RI Component. Greater 
difficulties in emotion regulation predicted worse RI (β = .15, p < .05) but sad mood had no 
effect on RI (β = -.03, p = .66); there was no interaction (β = -.03, p = .68; Table 7). Neither a 
priori hypothesis was supported, but an unexpected main effect of DERS emerged. Running this 
same regression except with baseline mood as a covariate entered into a step before the other 
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variables, DERS was similarly the only significant predictor of the RI Component (DERS β = .16, p 
< .05; other results not reported). Further, this effect is not explained by the greater sad mood 
that people with high DERS tend to experience. 
Exploratory Analyses 
Using the sample of 225 people with all-valid data, two multiple linear regression 
analyses were conducted to test the soundness of the assumption that continuous mood was a 
better metric than group membership. The RI Component was the outcome for both analyses. In 
the first analysis, the effect coded condition variable in Step 1 predicted the RI Component (β = -
.147, p < .05; sad mood coded as -1, neutral mood as 1) such that those in the sad condition had 
worse RI. The continuous mean mood rating in Step 2 did not predict the RI Component (β = -
.02, p = .81), nor did their interaction term in Step 3 (β = .02, p = .76; Table 8). In the second 
analysis, the continuous mean mood rating in Step 1 did not predict the RI Component (β = -.07, 
p = .27), nor did the effect coded condition variable in Step 2 (β = -.14, p = .06), nor did their 
interaction term in Step 3 (β = .02, p = .76; Table 9). None of the mood variables correlated with 
the Stroop RI metric or Go/No-go RI metric, but sad mood condition predicted worse Stop Signal 
Task RI (r = -.15, p < .05) and worse RI Component (r = -.15, p < .05). Neither the task response 
inhibition metrics nor the RI Component correlated with any of the difference scores between 
base mood rating and mood ratings 2 – 4 (p > .51). 
The condition variable demonstrated predictive power in the regressions and 
correlations with RI variables. Considering this, four regressions were run with the condition 
variable in place of the continuous mood variable in Step 1, DERS as the moderator in Step 1, 
their interaction in Step 2, and the RI Component and each RI metric as outcomes. There were 
no main effects or interaction effects for the regressions with the Stroop RI and Go/No-go RI 
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metrics as outcomes (the results of these two regressions are not reported). However, sad 
condition predicted worse RI on the Stop Signal Task (β = -.17, p < .05). DERS (β = .10, p = .13) 
and the interaction term (β = -.10, p = .11; Table 10) did not predict the RI metric (the same 
pattern emerged when running this regression with baseline mood as a covariate, with only sad 
condition predicting RI on the Stop Signal Task (β = -.17, p < .05). In a separate regression, sad 
condition (β = -.16, p < .05) and DERS (β = .18, p < .01) were main effects and they nearly 
interacted to predict the RI Component (β = -.12, p = .07; Table 11). Though the high p-value 
indicates high odds that this is a false positive, these three variables were modeled in Figure 2 
and a simple slopes analysis was conducted. In the neutral group, DERS did not predict the RI 
Component (that is, the regression line’s slope was not significantly different from zero; β = .07, 
p = .48, B = .003, Std. Error = .005). In the sad group, more difficulties in emotion regulation 
predicted worse performance on the RI tasks (that is, the regression line’s slope was significantly 
different from zero; β = .30, p < .01, B = .02, Std. Error = .005). Results were similar when 
running this same regression with baseline mood as a covariate (sad condition β = -.16, p < .05, 
DERS β = .18, p < .05, interaction term β = -.12, p = .07). 
The relative strength of correlations provide more evidence that group membership 
mattered, though only one of the below correlations was significantly different from one 
another. Some correlations were significant within the sad group but not within the neutral 
group (correlations within groups are reported in text rather than in tables). The RI Component 
correlated with DERS in the overall sample (r = .16, p < .05) and in the sad group (r = .30, p < 
.01), but not in the neutral group (r = .07, p > .05). However, this evidence is limited because the 
correlation from the neutral group is not significantly smaller than the correlation from the 
overall sample (z = .83, p > .05, all Fisher’s r to z transformations are two-tailed) nor is it 
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significantly smaller than the sad group correlation (z = 1.82, p > .05). The only subscale that 
correlates with the RI Component is DERS-Impulse; the RI Component had a larger correlation 
with the DERS-Impulse scale in the sad group (r = .32, p < .01) than in the neutral group (r = .07, 
p > .05; z = 1.97, p < .05). Looking into individual RI tasks, the Go/no-go RI metric correlated with 
DERS-Impulse only in the sad group (r = .21, p < .05; r = .08, p > .05) and the correlations were 
not significantly different (z = 1.08, p > .05); the Stroop RI metric correlated with two DERS 
subscales only in the sad group (Impulse r = .17, p < .05 and Aware r = -.18, p < .5; neutral group 
has p > .35 for both and neither correlation pair is significantly different, with z <.89 and p > .05 
for both); and the Stop-Signal RI metric correlated with two DERS subscales only in the sad 
group (Impulse r = .18, p < .05 and Clarity r = .20, p < .05; neutral group has p > .78 for both and 
neither correlation pair is significantly different, with z < 1.69 and p > .05 for both). 
Among the sad group participants, fewer difficulties in emotion regulation were 
associated with a greater decrease in mood after writing about a sad event (that is, difference 
score between rating one and two; r = -.18, p < .05; statistics reported only in text); this 
association was also present with the subscales Aware (r = -.26, p < .01) and Clarity (r = -.26, p < 
.01). Among the neutral group participants, the mood difference score correlated only with the 
subscale Goals (r = -.17, p < .05). Because participants were asked to change their mood, 
perhaps those with greater emotion regulation ability were more able to up-regulate their sad 
mood as they were instructed to do, but this is more likely a restriction-of-range artifact of 
measurement. Baseline mood is confounded with DERS score (r = -.46, p < .01); those with 
worse emotion regulation abilities had sadder moods before the mood manipulation, so those 
with better emotion regulation skills were able to report greater decreases in mood. Supporting 
the measurement artifact explanation is a regression predicting the same mood difference score 
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with baseline mood and DERS score together in the first step (using sad group participants); 
higher baseline mood predicted greater mood difference (β = .40, p < .01) and DERS was not 
significant (β = .004, p = .97). Replacing DERS with Clarity yielded a similar result, though Aware 
nearly predicted mood difference (β = -.16, p = .06) along with baseline mood (β = .36, p < .01). 
Further, tolerance statistics were not indicative of multicollinearity for any of the regressions, 
and adding the baseline mood rating variable as a covariate in regressions resulted in similar 
results. 
Sad mood and emotion regulation do not predict RI scores from individual tasks. Three 
regressions were conducted; they were identical to the a priori regression except that the three 
RI metrics were the dependent variables instead of the RI Component, and the independent 
variables were the mood ratings prior to the task rather than the mean mood rating. (1) The 
Stroop RI metric is not predicted by DERS (β = .06, p = .32) or reported mood before the Stroop 
task (β = .-.02, p = .78), nor is it predicted by their interaction (β = -.03, p = .63; Table 12). (2) The 
Stop Signal Task RI metric is not predicted by DERS (β = .05, p = .45) or reported mood before 
the task (β = -.11, p = .11), nor is it predicted by their interaction (β = -.04, p = .58; Table 130). (3) 
The Go/No-go RI metric is not predicted by DERS (β = .07, p = .28) or reported mood before the 
task (β = -.06, p = .35), nor is it predicted by their interaction (β = .01, p = .86; Table 14). Each of 
these regressions were conducted with only the neutral mood induction and sad mood 
induction sample, but there were no main effects in these analyses either (the results of these 
six regressions were not reported).
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
 This study explored the relative strength of two emotion-cognitive interaction models in 
their ability to predict cognitive effectiveness during sad mood: affect-as-information and 
resource allocation. The former predicts more efficient cognition during sad mood due to 
increased focus on detail and analysis, and the latter predicts less efficient cognition during sad 
mood due to sad thought content using up limited cognitive resources, thus leaving fewer 
resources for performance of cognitive tasks. To investigate these theories, the interplay of sad 
mood, emotion regulation, and response inhibition (RI) were studied. This study differs from 
most other studies (1) by using sample of greater than 200 participants, (2) by using a multiple-
indicator composite measure of RI, and (3) by using cool tasks that measure RI without the 
immediate influence of emotion in the task stimuli, and thus whose variance is comprised of a 
larger proportion of RI performance compared to hot tasks. Participants were inducted into a 
neutral or sad mood by writing and reflecting on either a typical day or a sad event from their 
past. Then they completed three RI tasks, rating their mood before each task.  
A Priori Hypotheses 
 Different theories predict facilitative or detrimental effects of sad mood on executive 
functions such as RI, so mood was hypothesized to either improve or worsen RI, and greater 
difficulties in emotion regulation were hypothesized to strengthen this association (i.e., 
moderation). Mood ratings did not predict the RI Component nor any of the RI metrics from the 
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individual tasks, and difficulties in emotion regulation did not interact with mood ratings to 
predict any of these outcomes. If sad mood had improved RI scores, this would have supported 
an affect-as-information model; if sad mood had worsened RI scores, this would have supported 
a resource allocation/cognitive load model. This null result supports neither of these theories, 
and instead suggests that a negatively valenced mood does not impact response inhibition. 
Though the hypotheses were not supported, exploratory findings inform the research question. 
Sad Condition Effects 
 A different metric of mood—simply being in the sad condition—resulted in a worse RI 
Component score. This extends Ellis and Ashbrook’s (1988) theory that sad mood worsens 
performance on memory tasks; however, the present results suggest that it is not sad mood per 
se that impairs RI performance. Rather, being in the sad mood condition could have worsened RI 
performance because participants were distracted by thoughts related to the sad event they 
wrote about. Those in the neutral condition wrote about their typical day instead of a more 
arousing and valenced sad event, so perhaps the less intense topic of their writing triggered 
fewer distracting thoughts to consume their attention. Those in the sad condition may have 
exhibited worse RI due to cognitive resources being used up by distracting thoughts about the 
sad event they wrote about; their minds may thus have wandered away from the task at hand 
more frequently. If this is true then it makes sense that random placement in the sad condition 
hurt RI scores but self-ratings of mood did not—writing about a sad event would have caused 
both a sad mood and worse RI performance, but sad mood would not have caused worse RI 
performance. In other words, writing about a sad event could have caused a lingering distraction 
which in turn impaired RI performance, while the sad mood that was caused by the same writing 
did not in turn affect RI performance. This possibility is supportive of resource 
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allocation/cognitive load theories. The sad condition may have triggered distracting thoughts via 
rumination, mind-wandering, and/or some other process, which competed for cognitive 
resources and worsened RI. The mind-wandering and rumination literatures offer helpful 
possible explanations for these effects. 
Mind-Wandering 
Marchetti, Koster, Klinger, and Alloy (2016) conceptualize spontaneous thought—
undirected, effortless thought that is unrelated to the current environment or task—as an 
umbrella term that encompasses mind-wandering. Spontaneous thought, they contend, is a 
precursor that can lead to either adaptive outcomes like creativity or planning, or depressive 
and maladaptive outcomes like rumination, hopelessness, low self-esteem, and cognitive 
reactivity. They propose several individual differences factors that increase the likelihood of 
these maladaptive outcomes: trait negative affectivity, mood, and stress, all of which may 
reduce one’s attentiveness to external stimuli. Others define mind-wandering as “a shift of 
attention away from a primary task toward internal information, such as memories” (Smallwood 
& Schooler, 2013, p. 130). These authors predict that mind-wandering occurs more frequently 
during simple tasks, impairs performance on demanding tasks, and competes with task 
performance for cognitive resources. If these positions are valid, variables such as spontaneous 
thought and mind-wandering would impact cognitive performance. 
Mind-wandering and inhibitory control/response inhibition. Findings from the mind-
wandering literature support the explanation that those in the sad condition performed worse 
due to distraction. The context and content regulation hypotheses inform the interplay of mind-
wandering and cognitive performance (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). The context regulation 
hypothesis incorporates these findings by holding that for cognition to be operating most 
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effectively, thoughts unrelated to the task at hand are generated less often when the task 
requires continuous attention, and that unrelated thoughts harm performance when the task 
does require continuous attention. Mind-wandering would then harm performance less if 
certain contextual variables are present, namely, if the task requires only minimal monitoring or 
when automated performance is sufficient (Teasdale et al., 1995); likewise, mind-wandering has 
been found to worsen cognitive performance in demanding tasks (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). 
Randall, Oswald, and Beier (2014) carried out a meta-analysis on mind-wandering, concluding 
that the available data supports cognitive resource allocation models: more resource-consuming 
mind-wandering worsened cognitive task performance while on-task thoughts improved 
performance, and both of these associations were stronger for complex tasks. It follows that RI 
task performance would be impaired during mind-wandering because RI tasks demand 
continuous attention, and slipping into automatic processing may make prepotent and 
dominant responses more difficult to inhibit, leading to more errors and a worse RI score. 
Researchers have shown that mind-wandering likely reduces cognitive analysis and awareness 
of the outside world. Smallwood, Beach, Schooler, and Handy (2008) administered a go/no-go 
task to participants, and considered responses to no-go targets as indicators of mind-wandering. 
Further, they measured participants’ P300 amplitudes resulting from seeing the no-go stimulus, 
where the P300 amplitude acts as a metric of how much attention the person is directing 
toward the task. They predicted lower P300 amplitude preceding no-go trials that were errantly 
responded to, and this was exactly what they found. Amplitudes were lower in response to 
commission errors (i.e., mind-wandering), representing less cognition being directed toward the 
task. In summary, a biological measure showed that attention reductions during a task led to 
failures in response inhibition . 
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One way executive functions can be impaired is via perceptual decoupling, which is a 
shift in attention away from an external task (here, the RI tasks) and toward self-generated 
thoughts (the recent sad reflections). This shift results in cognition being more focused toward 
internal rather than external input, and with less attention paid to the external input 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Stated somewhat differently, Teasdale et al. (1995) gathered 
data supporting the position that generation of thoughts that are not related to external stimuli 
requires executive resources, leaving less available for executive functioning tasks; Smallwood 
(2010) argued for this position as well, asserting that because mind-wandering content can be 
consciously reported on, it consumes prefrontal resources that are used for executive 
functioning. McVay and Kane (2010) offer the alternative interpretation that mind-wandering 
does not consume executive control resources; instead it results from a failure of executive 
control. In this view, cognitive resources are not divided between mind-wandering and tasks; 
rather, mind-wandering occurs when interfering content disrupts executive control. Both views 
support a negative association between mind-wandering and performance, and the present 
results can fit into either of these views; perhaps (1) sad mind-wandering competed for 
executive control resources thereby reducing RI capacity, or perhaps (2) the sad memories 
served as interference that distracted participants, led to failures of executive functioning and 
response inhibition, and encouraged mind-wandering. 
Mind-wandering and affect. A different pattern of findings is reflected in the content 
regulation hypothesis, which holds that the content of the mind-wandering affects how 
functional it is (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Another finding supporting the content regulation 
hypothesis is that negative affect and mind-wandering are related. The association between 
mind-wandering and emotions is complex and not yet confidently understood (Mason, Brown, 
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Mar, & Smallwood, 2013), but evidence that is mostly correlational suggests that people tend to 
mind-wander more often if they are in negative or sad moods. One example of this—notable for 
its ability to infer some causality—is provided by Poerio, Totterdell, and Miles (2013). They 
conducted an experience sampling study showing that people’s minds were more likely to 
wander shortly after they reported feeling sad (but see Killingsworth & Gilbert [2010] for an 
experience sampling study that found evidence of causality in the reverse direction, but with 
problematic hours-long gaps between time points). 
A study by Seibert and Ellis (1991) supported these points; each of two experiments 
induced 45 participants into happy, neutral, or sad mood states, followed by a perceptual 
grouping memory task. Participants in Experiment 1 listed their thoughts after the task; those in 
Experiment 2 said their thoughts out loud during the task. In both experiments, the neutral 
group performed better than the happy and sad groups, and the happy and sad groups did not 
differ from each other. Also in both experiments, participants in the neutral group reported a 
lower proportion of irrelevant thoughts compared to the happy and sad groups, who did not 
differ from each other. Further, all participants reporting more irrelevant thoughts tended to 
perform worse. These results suggest that happy and sad moods lead to more irrelevant 
thoughts and worse memory; distracting thoughts during a sad mood may also harm RI abilities. 
In sum, people in sad moods probably mind-wander more. In the present study, mood-
consistent content from the past was explicitly cued with the writing task, making it more likely 
that participants had thoughts of the sad event they wrote about while completing the RI tasks. 
In other words, participants in the present study’s sad group had primed themselves more 
specifically to mind-wander to sad content by recently writing about sad events from their past. 
Work by McVay and Kane (2013) suggests that personalized stimuli is likely to prime subsequent 
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thoughts that are unrelated to the task at hand. They developed a method in which words 
relevant to each participant’s own goals were displayed during a go/no-go task, and found that 
they triggered 3-4% more task-unrelated thoughts than non-personalized words. Others induced 
people to worry about delivering a speech (a future negatively valenced event), and found that 
those whose affect decreased more upon hearing about their upcoming speech experienced 
increased frequency of mind-wandering during a go/no-go task (Stawarczyk, Majerus, & 
D’Argembeau, 2013). Worrying about a future event or thinking about a future goal increases 
mind-wandering; the stimuli in the present study were different in that they were focused on 
the past rather than future goals or worries, yet similar to McVay and Kane’s induction in that 
they were personalized, and similar to Stawarczyk and colleagues’ induction in that they were 
sad in valence. 
Notably, mind-wandering to past events has been linked to negative affect (Ruby, 
Smallwood, Engen, & Singer, 2013). Participants completed a simple cognitive task and 
periodically answered questions including whether their thoughts were on-task, whether they 
were thinking about the past or future, whether they were thinking about themselves or others, 
and their mood. Researchers found that when participants were thinking about the past or 
about other people, they were more likely to experience a negative mood. This effect persisted 
even when these thoughts were positive in valence. Also, thoughts about the future and 
oneself, even if negative in valence, predicted positive mood. Smallwood et al. (2002) report 
studies on dysphoria and thoughts unrelated to the task at hand; they found that when people 
are not feeling dysphoric, rumination tends to improve task focus, but that when people are 
ruminating and feeling dysphoric, they tend to have decreased task focus due to increased 
thoughts unrelated to the task. The present study asked sad condition participants to think 
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about a sad event from the past, which decreased mood similar to Ruby and colleagues’ 
participants and encouraged both rumination and dysphoria similar to some of Smallwood et 
al.’s participants. This combination of thinking about the past and feeling dysphoric seems to be 
especially detrimental to performance on cognitive tasks. 
The present study was designed to compare the effects of sad and neutral mood, but 
considering the unexpected results of the condition variable but not the mood self-report 
variable predicting RI performance, the study could be cast in a different light: does the 
induction of a mental state that is conducive to mind-wandering affect RI performance more if 
the thought content is sad or neutral in valence? The present design unintentionally mirrored a 
common mind-wandering design, which involves a mind-wandering induction then completion 
of computerized tasks (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). The present inductions could be thought 
of as creating conditions that encourage mind-wandering. One condition encouraged neutrally-
valenced daily routine thoughts. The other condition encouraged self-generated sad thoughts 
and memories. The sad group participants were more likely to mind-wander because of the self-
generated thoughts that were more powerful and attention-grabbing due to their increased 
valence (and probably arousal). Mind-wandering was not measured in this study so these 
interpretations are certainly speculative, though this possibility is reasonable and supported by 
the literature. 
Rumination 
Rumination is another mental process that, though unmeasured in this experiment, may 
have been triggered by the sad writing task and contributed to worse RI performance. Some 
think of rumination as mind-wandering with a negative valence, but Christoff, Irving, Fox, 
Spreng, and Andrews-Hanna (2016) distinguish the two; to them, mind-wandering thoughts 
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jump from topic to topic, and rumination tends to focus on a theme or topic and is thus more 
constrained. Going beyond the commonly espoused descriptions of these cognitive constructs, 
the authors have developed a model that embeds mind-wandering and spontaneous thought 
into a broader model of thought (Christoff et al., 2016). They describe two ways thoughts can be 
constrained. First, a person can direct their thoughts deliberately using cognitive control. 
Second, a person’s thoughts can be constrained automatically via affective- and sensory-
salience drawing attention. Mind-wandering, then, is more deliberately constrained than a state 
like dreaming and less deliberately constrained than a state like creative or goal-directed 
thought, and less automatically constrained than a state like rumination. 
Interpreting the present results using this framework, a participant would likely perform 
best when engaging in goal-directed thought toward the RI task. However, recently recalled sad 
memories would serve as affectively salient automatic constraints that pull attention toward 
them, encouraging rumination and thus distraction from the task at hand. Further, from a 
cognitive load perspective, rumination would compete for attentional resources and lead to 
executive control failure. Rumination, then, is another cognitive process that could have been at 
play in harming sad-group participants’ RI capacity. Rumination could have occurred in addition 
to or in place of mind-wandering. 
A review by Roberts, Watkins, and Wills (2015) explores whether rumination causes 
inhibitory deficits. They found four experimental studies that use measures with good construct 
validity and investigate whether rumination leads to inhibitory deficits, and three of these four 
studies revealed findings that support rumination impairing performance on interference (a 
component of inhibitory control). A recent meta-analysis of 3,066 participants across 34 studies 
found that rumination predicted worse executive functions (Yang, Cao, Shields, Teng, & Liu, 
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2016). More specifically, they found that rumination was associated with lower inhibition ability 
(21 studies) and set-shifting ability (11 studies), but not working memory (8 studies). Similar to 
the present study, Young, Erickson, and Drevets (2012) used valenced autobiographical 
memories to study cognition. They displayed multiple positive, neutral, and negative cue words 
to participants, asked them to recall a memory after each word, then had them complete a 
simple perceptual attention task; they performed worse on the positive and negative trials 
compared to neutral trials, and worse on the negative trials compared to the positive trials. This 
may be because the valenced autobiographical memories consumed cognitive resources and 
made it more difficult for participants to stay focused on the task. This sampling of rumination 
research suggests that, perhaps in addition to mind-wandering, rumination may have played a 
role in the present study’s sad-group participants performing somewhat worse on response 
inhibition tasks. 
Implications for Emotion-Cognition Interaction Theories 
These results speak to the cognition-emotion interaction theories discussed above. 
These results are not explained by the affect-as-information theory, at least in regard to 
response inhibition—being in the sad mood condition was not associated with any 
improvements in RI efficiency. This is not evidence that sad moods do not encourage a more 
analytic cognitive style as posited by Schwarz and Bless (1991), though if sad moods do 
encourage analytic thinking, the present results suggest that this thinking style does not 
facilitate RI performance. The present results also suggest that—at least with RI—sad mood 
does not bias attention toward goal-relevant stimuli thereby conferring an advantage, as 
suggested by Mather and Sutherland’s arousal-biased competition theory (2011). Considering 
the discussion above on the possible impact of mind-wandering, these results are well-explained 
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by a resource-allocation model (Seibert & Ashbrook, 1988). The sad mood, particularly the 
ruminative content that was primed by the sad mood induction, may have distracted 
participants by consuming cognitive resources, leading to worsened RI performance. If this is the 
case, maybe the other theories are true but overshadowed by the distraction of rumination 
and/or mind-wandering explaining more variance, or maybe they are false at least for the 
executive function of RI. Overall, these results provide support for the cognitive-allocation 
model; this support does not tarnish the other theories, but it does speak against their 
applicability to response inhibition performance in the context of sad mood and distracting 
cognitions. 
Impact of Emotion Regulation 
Emotion regulation ability was influential in this study, adding to a small group of 
studies suggesting that it is worthwhile to examine emotion regulation along with RI. 
Participants who reported greater difficulty regulating their emotions performed worse on RI 
tasks. The cold tasks used by Lee, Turkel, Woods, Coffey, and Goetz (2012) did not correlate with 
affective lability or impulsiveness measures; due to the small sample, this finding does not 
preclude a true relationship. The present findings are however consistent with Lee and 
colleagues’ hot task findings; trait affective lability (a construct related to emotion regulation) 
reduced performance on hot RI tasks, and similar to their findings, the DERS-RI association 
persisted even after controlling for current mood. Lee and colleagues further found that greater 
self-reported attentional impulsiveness predicted worse RI as measured by the reaction time 
metric of a hot go/no-go task using faces. A similar finding emerged from the present study—
the Impulse subscale of the DERS correlated with RI. This subscale contains items that indicate 
difficulty controlling behavior while negative emotion is felt (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). This 
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correlation disappears when using only the neutral condition participants, but it becomes 
stronger when using only the sad mood condition participants; reflecting the scale description, 
Impulse scores only affected RI performance among those in the sad condition. There is more 
evidence that sad group placement influenced RI scores more among those with poor emotion 
regulation skills: though the interaction term was not significant, the simple slopes analysis 
revealed that those with greater difficulties in emotion regulation had worse RI if they were in 
the sad condition (Figure 2). Two tentative conclusions can be drawn from this data: emotion 
regulation skill does not affect RI during neutral mood, and those with strong emotion 
regulation skills are more able to modulate the detrimental effect of sad mood on cognition. 
The present study considers the state-side of RI and the trait-side of emotion regulation, 
but others have considered the other “sides” of these variables (e.g., Tang & Schmeichel, 2014). 
Joorman (2010) explains why poor cognitive control might harm emotion regulation ability. 
Those with worse cognitive control may have a lesser ability to push mood-congruent 
information out of their minds (here, the sad induction memories). Thus, mood-congruent 
information would use up limited working memory resources and impair performance. It could 
even be the case that executive functioning and self-regulation share a similar limited resource 
(perhaps effort and/or glucose; Kaplan & Berman, 2010). These authors discuss studies 
supporting both sides of this position—challenging self-regulation tasks have reduced future 
executive functioning performance and vice versa. The situation brought about for the present 
study’s sad-group participants would have placed resource-consuming demands on both of 
these processes, leaving fewer resources (e.g., effort or glucose) available for efficient 
deployment of response inhibition. Demands were placed on emotion regulation due to the sad 
memories and feelings of sadness, demands were placed on their executive functioning in that 
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they had to resist the interference caused by the sad memories, and performing the response 
inhibition tasks was another demand. Recall that the cognitive load/resource-allocation model 
was most supported by the results of the present study. Considering emotion regulation ability 
allows us to consider some of the mechanisms that may have driven reduced RI ability in the 
context of the sad condition. 
Links between emotion regulation and RI have been documented in the literature. 
Carlson and Wang (2007) tested children aged four to six using three laboratory measures of 
inhibitory control (Simon Says, touching of a toy that the children were asked not to touch, and 
disobeying instructions by peeking at a present that is being wrapped for the child). These 
inhibitory control tasks were combined into a single principal component, as were two 
laboratory measures of emotion regulation (suppressing disappointment when receiving an 
undesirable gift, and ability to suppress positive emotion in order to keep a secret). These two 
components were moderately correlated at the principal component level (r = .46), a finding 
that remained after controlling for age and verbal ability. Parent reports of self-control and 
emotion regulation also remained correlated after controlling for age and verbal ability. These 
two constructs are related and seem to develop in concert (Carlson & Wang, 2007). Other 
researchers found emotion regulation-cognitive control links in adults (Bridgett, Oddi, Laake, 
Murdock, & Bachmann (2012): participants who reported on a questionnaire that they had 
stronger tendencies to express negative affect (e.g., “It is difficult for me to hide my fear.”) 
performed worse on the Stroop color-word task on average. 
 Fitting these and the present study’s findings into Gross’s (1998) process model of 
emotion regulation, attentional deployment is one mechanism of emotion regulation that likely 
played a part in affecting RI task performance. Those exhibiting poor emotion regulation by 
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focusing their attention in a ruminative fashion toward the sad event they wrote about would 
be using up cognitive resources that would have aided in their RI task performance. Further, 
those exhibiting skilled emotion regulation may have instead used distraction by shifting their 
attention to the RI task at hand rather than the sad event they wrote about, thereby improving 
their RI score (Suri et al., 2013). Other emotion regulation variables are interesting to consider 
here, such as automatic versus deliberate and effortful regulation of emotion, and emotion 
regulation in-the-moment as opposed to a trait measure; however the present study does not 
include data to address these aspects of emotion regulation. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
A goal of this project was to reduce some of the methodological limitations of similar 
studies; a sample of over 200 people was used, RI was measured using cool tasks and multiple 
indicators, and multiple mood self-reports and mood induction refreshers were used to ensure a 
mood induction that lasted long enough. These features strengthen the finding that sad mood 
per se does not affect response inhibition, though it could be that an established measure such 
as the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule may have provided a more reliable measure of 
current mood and yielded different results (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Though the study 
uncovered evidence that rumination and mind-wandering may harm response inhibition, note 
that this and other findings are post hoc and derived from many exploratory analyses. Thus, 
they are less likely to replicate and are more likely to represent Type I errors. This study used a 
fast one-item valence measure of affect and did not measure level of arousal; this had the 
advantage of moving participants quickly from manipulation to task so the manipulation effect 
had less time to fade away, but it had the disadvantage of having an incomplete picture of 
affect’s components by excluding measurement of arousal (Kuppens et al., 2013). Other 
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common limitations apply, such as whether this undergraduate convenience sample generalizes 
to other populations. These results also may not generalize to other contexts and conditions 
(Schaller, 2016); for example, if reduced RI scores are truly explained by distraction from 
emotional thoughts, then an induction that generates a sad mood but does not encourage sad 
thoughts may not reduce RI at all (e.g., listening to sad music or viewing sad pictures may not 
affect RI). Experiments aimed at finding the boundary conditions under which an effect occurs 
would determine whether this effect replicates, and to which situations this effect does not 
generalize (Greenwald, Pratkanis, Leippe, & Baumgardner, 1986). 
Future research could directly investigate whether mind-wandering affects RI by parsing 
out the effects of mood and distracting thought. This could be done by measuring participants’ 
thoughts during or after task completion and adding a condition that does not change mood but 
triggers distracting thoughts; for example, participants could be asked to write instructions on 
how to complete a complicated task. Similarly, probes inserted within tasks could ask 
participants whether their minds were wandering, and to what topic they were wandering (e.g., 
ruminative thought about the past). Studies like this would test the sad condition finding for 
replication and would help determine whether mind-wandering, rumination, and/or sad mood 
drives the effect on RI. Trying to measure valence and arousal separately would further inform 
which of these two components of affect—if either—are driving the effect on RI. A larger study 
using sophisticated multivariate analyses would shed more light on these questions. For 
example, one could use a latent variable approach with multiple executive functions, examining 
how mood affects them. Simultaneously accounting for multiple variables within the same 
model would give clues to the mechanisms through which mind-wandering, rumination, and 
mood might affect cognition. 
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Clinical Implications 
These results have clinical implications in psychological assessment contexts. To 
measure cognitive constructs accurately, the patient should be able to perform to the best of 
their ability. Invalid assessment results can be produced by a number of factors, including 
hunger, effects of medication, fatigue, and illness. This study contributes to a literature that 
reveals the influence of rumination and mind-wandering on cognition. Just as examiners may 
consider results with caution if their patient is very fatigued during testing, the present findings 
support the practice of considering results cautiously if their patient is significantly distracted by 
rumination or mind-wandering; respecting the ability of such non-task cognitive demands to 
confound measurement may reduce misdiagnosis of problems such as mild cognitive 
impairment and dementia. Lastly, the impaired thinking ability often seen in depression—such 
as difficulty concentrating or making decisions—receive less focus than they deserve in 
treatments. In depression interventions, it would be worthwhile to target the executive 
functioning deficits that can co-occur with depression, including using stimulus control to 
eliminate distractions from work environments and teaching structured guidelines for assessing 
the pros and cons of choices. 
The intent of this study was to explore competing theories of emotion-cognition 
interaction by taking a close look at response inhibition and sad mood. Affect-as-information 
theories would predict helpful effects of sad mood on executive functions such as RI, as sad 
mood is purported to trigger a more detailed and analytical processing style that can be 
beneficial to cognitive tasks; resource allocation models would predict a worsening of executive 
functions, as sad mood is purported to consume limited cognitive resources such as effort, 
attention, and working memory, leaving fewer resources available for efficient cognitive 
 
 
61 
 
functioning. Results revealed that being in the sad mood condition worsened RI slightly; 
however, because mood self-reports did not predict RI, this was likely due to other effects of 
being in the sad condition. Thinking about sad memories encourages rumination and mind-
wandering, which likely drove the reduction in RI ability. There was some evidence that those 
with poor emotion regulation tended to have even more impaired response inhibition while in a 
sad mood. The results of this study are most consistent with the resource allocation rather than 
the affect-as-information model; reflecting on sad memories seems to have a negative impact 
on response inhibition.
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APPENDIX A 
 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Demographics 
 
    Retained Sample N (%)  Main Analysis Sample N (%)  
Freshman    183 (67)  154 (68) 
Sophomore    57 (21)   47 (21) 
Junior     15 (6)   11 (5) 
Senior     9 (3)   7 (3) 
Other     9 (3)   6 (3)     
Black/African American   114 (42)  92 (41) 
White/Caucasian   90 (33)   75 (33) 
Multiracial    27 (10)   22 (10) 
Latino/Hispanic    20 (7)   19 (8) 
Asian/Pacific Islander   18 (7)   14 (6) 
Other     3 (1)   2 (1) 
Native American/Alaskan Native 1 (<1)   1 (<1)     
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Table 2 
 
Pearson Correlation Matrix of DERS Subscales with Each Other 
 
  Nonaccept Goals Impulse Aware  Strategies Clarity  
Overall DERS .78**  .69** .73**  .39**  .90**  .72** 
Nonaccept   .48** .47**  .11  .68**  .48** 
Goals     .49**  -.07  .67**  .30** 
Impulse      .07  .63**  .40** 
Aware         .17**  .44** 
Strategies          .55**  
Note. ** p < .01; n = 272 
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Table 3 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  α N Min Max  Mean (SD)  Skew Kurtosis 
DERS (all valid) .92 225 37 127  74.63 (18.78)  .46 -.31 
DERS  .93 272 37 133  76.66 (19.95)  .51 -.26 
Nonacceptance .88 272 6 27  11.83 (4.99)  1.01 .59 
Goals  .88 272 5 25  13.61 (4.61)  .41 -.62 
Impulse .86 272 6 27.44  10.79 (4.49)  1.19 1.29 
Awareness .82 272 6 28  14.19 (4.77)  .38 -.33 
Strategies .85 272 8 33.58  15.99 (5.82)  .79 .14 
Clarity  .77 272 5 20.41  10.20 (3.37)  .53 -.28  
First mood rating 273 9.88 100  70.34 (20.03)  -.88 .18 
Stroop mood rating 264 0 100  58.00 (21.42)  -.21 -.72 
Go/No-go mood rating 272 0 100  57.98 (22.32)  -.23 -.77 
SST mood rating 232 0 100  58.19 (22.80)  -.36 -.57 
Mean mood 2 – 4 225 0 100  57.66 (21.42)  -.17 -.78  
Mean sad mood 2 – 4  112 0 96  49.01 (21.17)  .25 -.50 
Mean N. mood 2 – 4 113 25 100  66.24 (18.01)  -.43 -.57  
RI Component  225 -2.63 3.13  0.00 (1.00)  .15 .26 
Go/no-go RI  272 .00 .82  .28 (.18)  .79 .44 
Stroop Control RT 264 521.19 1269.26 759.42 (146.10)  .95 .43 
Stroop Incong. RT 264 608.89 1487.84 905.17 (165.62)  .79 .58 
Stroop RI  264 -117.07 408.57  145.51 (84.40)  .38 1.39 
Stop-Signal Task RI 232 96.86 367.01  224.76 (50.05)  .23 .51  
Note. DERS = Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale; First Mood Rating = from all retained 
participants; Mean Mood Ratings = mean of mood ratings 2 – 4 for participants with all valid 
data; Sad and Neutral Mood Ratings = mean of mood ratings 2 – 4 for participants in the sad and 
neutral conditions, respectively; SST = Stop-Signal Task; RI = response inhibition metric 
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Table 4 
 
Principal Components Analysis on the Three RI Metrics 
 
Component Eigenvalue % Variance Explained Cumulative % Variance Explained  
1  1.40  46.70   46.70 
2  .87  28.87   75.56 
3  .73  24.43   100.00      
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Table 5 
 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  
1. RI  .73** .60** .71** -.08 -.06 -.09 -.07 -.07 -.15* .16* 
Component (225) (225) (225) (225) (225) (225) (225) (225) (225) (225) 
2. Go/no-go RI 1 .14* .27** -.05 -.08 -.05 -.04 -.05 -.07 .08 
  (272) (263) (231) (272) (272) (271) (271) (271) (272) (271) 
3. Stroop RI  1 .16* -.03 -.02 -.04 .01 -.01 -.07 .07 
   (264) (226) (264) (264) (264) (264) (264) (264) (264) 
4. Stop-Signal RI  1 -.06 -.05 -.08 -.12 -.09 -.15* .08 
    (232) (232) (232) (232) (232) (232) (232) (231) 
5. Baseline mood   1 .54** .54** .58** .58** -.04 -.46** 
     (273) (273) (272) (272) (272) (273) (272) 
6. Go/no-go mood    1 .87** .88** .96** .38** -.27** 
      (273) (272) (272) (272) (273) (272) 
7. Stroop mood      1 .88** .96** .36** -.27** 
       (272) (272) (272) (272) (271) 
8. Stop-Signal mood      1 .96** .35** -.28** 
        (272) (272) (272) (271) 
9. Mean mood 2 – 4       1 .38** -.29** 
         (272) (272) (271)  
10. Mood condition        1 .10 
          (273) (272)  
11. DERS          1 
           (272)  
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01; task mood ratings occurred immediately before the task; mean mood 
is the mean of the three pre-task mood ratings; mood condition is effect-coded with sad mood 
at -1; higher RI scores indicate worse RI; lower mood scores indicate more sad mood 
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Table 6 
 
Pearson Correlation Matrix with DERS Subscales 
 
  Nonaccept Goals Impulse Aware  Strategies Clarity  
RI Component .11  .08 .19*  .08  .11  .13 
Go/no-go RI .05  .01 .14*  .09  .01  .08 
Stroop RI .07  .05 .12  -.05  .08  .02 
Stop-Signal RI .05  .03 .07  .11  .03  .07 
Baseline -.31**  -.28** -.33**  -.20**  -.45**  -.39** 
mood 
Go/no-go -.19**  -.23** -.20**  -.07  -.26**  -.18** 
mood 
Stroop  -.19**  -.20** -.19**  -.08  -.26**  -.22** 
mood 
Stop-Signal -.22**  -.21** -.20**  -.08  -.26**  -.20** 
mood 
Mean mood 2 – 4 
Full sample -.21**  -.22** -.20**  -.08  -.27**  -.21** 
Neutral -.37**  -.28** -.31**  -.15  -.44**  -.37** 
       Sad  -.15  -.27** -.21*  -.03  -.26**  -.13  
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01; n = 272; correlation between total DERS score and Mean mood 2 – 4 
is -.46** in the neutral group and -.25** in the sad group 
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Table 7 
 
A Priori Regression Predicting the RI Component with DERS and Sad Mood, n = 225 
 
   Unstandardized  Standard 
Predictor R2 Coefficient  Error  β p Tolerance  
Step 1  .027 
Mean mood rating -.001   .003  -.031 .653 .922 
DERS   .008   .004  .154 .027 .922 
Step 2  .028 
Interaction term .000   .000  -.028 .675 .997   
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Table 8 
 
Exploratory Regression Predicting the RI Component with the Condition Variable, then Sad 
Mood, n = 225 
 
   Unstandardized  Standard 
Predictor R2 Coefficient  Error  β p Tolerance  
Step 1  .147 
Mood condition -.146   .066  -.147 .028 1.000 
Step 2  .148 
Mean mood rating -.001   .003  -.018 .806 .838 
Step 3  .149 
Interaction term .001   .003  .020 .765 .976   
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Table 9 
 
Exploratory Regression Predicting the RI Component with Sad Mood, then the Condition 
Variable, n = 225 
 
   Unstandardized  Standard 
Predictor R2 Coefficient  Error  β p Tolerance  
Step 1  .074 
Mean mood rating -.003   .003  -.074 .268 1.000 
Step 2  .148 
Mood condition -.139   .072  -.140 .056 .838 
Step 3  .149 
Interaction term .001   .003  .020 .765 .976   
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Table 10 
 
Exploratory Regression Predicting the Stop Signal RI Metric with DERS and Mood Condition, 
n = 231 
 
   Unstandardized  Standard 
Predictor R2 Coefficient  Error  β p Tolerance  
Step 1  .035 
Mood condition -8.343   3.262  -.167 .011 .990 
DERS   .264   .174  .099 .131 .990 
Step 2  .045 
Interaction term -.276   .174  -.103 .115 .993   
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Table 11 
 
Exploratory Regression Predicting the RI Component with DERS and Mood Condition, n = 225 
 
   Unstandardized  Standard 
Predictor R2 Coefficient  Error  β p Tolerance  
Step 1  .053 
Mood condition -.162   .065  -.162 .014 .992 
DERS   .009   .003  .177 .008 .992 
Step 2  .067 
Interaction term -.006   .003  -.119 .068 .995   
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Table 12 
 
Exploratory Regression Predicting the Stroop RI Metric with DERS and Sad Mood, n = 264 
 
   Unstandardized  Standard 
Predictor R2 Coefficient  Error  β p Tolerance  
Step 1  .071 
Pretask mood  -.071   .253  -.018 .781 .922 
DERS   .270   .270  .064 .318 .922 
Step 2  .078 
Interaction term -.006   .012  -.030 .627 .995   
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Table 13 
 
Exploratory Regression Predicting the Stop Signal RI Metric with DERS and Sad Mood, n = 231 
 
   Unstandardized  Standard 
Predictor R2 Coefficient  Error  β p Tolerance  
Step 1  .018 
Pretask mood  -.238   .150  -.109 .113 .919 
DERS   .138   .182  .052 .451 .919 
Step 2  .019 
Interaction term -.004   .007  -.036 .583 .997   
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Table 14 
 
Exploratory Regression Predicting the Go/No-go RI Metric with DERS and Sad Mood, n = 271 
 
   Unstandardized  Standard 
Predictor R2 Coefficient  Error  β p Tolerance  
Step 1  .010 
Pretask mood  .000   .001  -.059 .352 .929 
DERS   .001   .001  .069 .278 .929 
Step 2  .010 
Interaction term .000   .000  .011 .863 .992   
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Figure 1 
 
Procedural Flowchart 
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Figure 2 
 
Simple Slopes Analysis on the Effect of DERS on the RI Component within each Condition 
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APPENDIX B 
 
TASK DETAILS 
 
 
Go/no-go text instructions on computer screen: Put the pointer finger of your dominant 
hand on the spacebar. On each trial, a green or blue rectangle will appear on the screen. Press 
the spacebar as quickly as possible when a GREEN rectangle appears. If a BLUE rectangle 
appears, DO NOT respond at all. Try to respond as quickly as possible while making as few errors 
as possible. There'll be no practice. The task will take about 10 minutes to complete. 
Go/no-go script: When the text is first displayed, the research assistant says “read the 
instructions, take your time.” When the participant finishes reading, the research assistant says 
“don’t press anything when you see a blue rectangle,” then briefly answers any questions the 
participant has about the task. 
Color Word Stroop instructions on computer screen: In this task you will see words and 
asterisks (***) presented in different colors. Your task is to say into the microphone the COLOR 
each word or line of asterisks is printed in while ignoring what the words actually say. Example: 
if you see the word RED printed in the color GREEN, say GREEN. Try to respond as quickly and 
accurately as you can, because you will be timed. If an incorrect response is made, a red X will 
appear briefly. 
Color Word Stroop script: When the text is first displayed, the research assistant says 
“read the instructions, take your time.” When the participant finishes reading, the research 
assistant says “does that make sense?” Regardless of the answer, they say “say the color of the 
ink out loud into the mic. An X appears if you make a mistake, but do not say the color of the X” 
and then they wait for the participant to complete the first incongruent trial. If the participant 
says the correct color, the research assistant says “good” and leaves the room. If the participant 
says an incorrect color on the first incongruent trial, the research assistant says “say the color of 
the ink” and leaves the room. 
Stop-Signal Task instructions on computer screen: Press the left arrow key when you see 
a left-arrow and the right arrow key when you see a right-arrow. Sometimes, the arrow is 
followed by a sound. When the sound plays, DO NOT RESPOND to the current arrow. DO NOT 
WAIT for the sound to play, because if you wait, the computer will wait to play the sound. 
Respond as FAST and ACCURATE as you can, but try to STOP yourself from pressing a key when 
you hear the sound. Press the 'Continue >>' button to start practice. 
Stop-Signal Task script: When the text is first displayed, the research assistant says “read 
the instructions, take your time.” When the participant finishes reading, the research assistant 
says “does that make sense?” Regardless of the answer, they say “when you hear a tone, don’t 
respond to that arrow.” 
